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INTRODUCTION

For almost a decade, the legal profession struggled with the constitutionality
and efficacy of restricting the advertisement of legal services.' During this time,

*

Editor's NOTE: This note received the Gertirude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize for the

best student note submitted in the Fall 1985 semester.
1. Historically, there have been three well-defined periods in the United States during which
attorney advertising has been an issue of public concern. Most policies against the advertising of
legal services were imported from England. Until about 1830, American lawyers, often trained in
England, constituted a core of elite barristers who considered themselves professionals whose status
was far above a mere trade. Consequently, advertising their services would be undignified. See
Francis & Johnson, The Emperor's Old Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 WILLAMETrE L.J.
221, 223-24 (1977). A shift in the political climate during the mid-1800s resulted in public discontent
with the legal profession. As a consequence, much of the self-regulatory power of the legal community decreased. See Comment, Of Shibboleths, Sense and Changing Tradition - Lawyer Advertising,
61 MARQ. L. REV. 644, 645 (1978). During this period, standards for admission to practice law
were minimal. Prohibitions on advertising lacked authority and were generally not enforced. Follo%*ing the Civil War, members of the legal profession reorganized themselves in the face of widespread corruption both among their peers and within the court system. Organized bars began
forming, including the American Bar Association (ABA) at the national level in 1878. See Francis
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the Supreme Court issued a number of landmark decisions2 shaping the framework within which every state bar must operate. Following Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona,3 the Court exhibited an expansive attitude towards the advertising of
professional services. 4 With few exceptions,' the Court narrowed the spectrum
of allowable advertising restrictions. Bates and its progeny view attorney advertising as not only acceptable but necessary for the efficient provision of legal
& Johnson, supra, at 225. Following the passage of a few state Codes of Ethics, the ABA in 1908
issued its first Canons of Professional Ethics to guide state bars. Canon 27 prohibited solicitation
of business through circulars, advertising, or personal communications. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs No. 27 (1908). Until the last decade the codes in most states parallelled the ABA's
outright ban on advertising. It was not until two distinct lines of cases developed during the 1960s
and 1970s that the Bar's ban on attorney advertising was jeopardized. The first line of cases
established that access to the court system is a fundamental right under the first amendment. See
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
The second line of cases, discussed infra notes 27-58, established the doctrine of commercial speech
which declares that speech proposing a commercial transaction is protected by the first amendment.
Both lines of reasoning ultimately lead to the declaration in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977), that total prohibitions on the advertising of routine legal services are unconstitutional. Since Bates, there has been a transitional struggle. State bars have grudgingly withdrawn
from the pre-Bates advertising bans by re-regulating attorney advertising. Consequently, the Supreme
Court has addressed a number of additional attorney advertising cases. See infra notes 61-137 and
accompanying text. The present controversy over the constitutional limitations of attorney advertising, while presenting novel issues subject to contemporary analysis, originates in an historical
skirmish.
2. See infra notes 61-137 and accompanying text (discussing the five Supreme Court pronouncements on attorney advertising).
3. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Bates is the seminal case holding outright prohibitions on the advertising of routine legal services unconstitutional.
4. Since Bates, the Court has rendered favorable decisions on behalf of defendant bar associations in only two instances. The first involved a classic case of "ambulance chasing" where
the Court agreed that in-person solicitation, a practice rife with the possibilities for overreaching,
invasion of privacy, undue influence, and outright fraud, was properly the subject of governmental
regulation. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). The second involved the advertising of contingency fee information without a statement that a client may be liable for other
litigation costs. In such a case, a state bar could require disclosure of such information since
members of the public might otherwise be misled into believing they would incur no litigation
costs. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2283 (1985).
Zauderer language indicates the Court's increasingly "hands off" approach to the regulation
of attorney advertising. Arguably, the Court's holding that bar associations may require attorneys
who advertise contingency fees to also disclose litigation costs signals greater advertising regulation.
However, requiring certain information to be disclosed in particular types of ads generally increases
the flow of useful consumer information. This result is consistent with the commercial speech
mandate of competitive information markets. Also, the contingent disclosure of information impinges
on an attorney's first amendment rights to a lesser degree than outright restrictions on information.
See id., at 2282; cf. id. at 2284-2287 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5. The Court's decision in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), dealt with
direct in-person solicitation which is inherently different from indirect forms of advertising. The
disclosure requirement in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary- Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985),
empowers state bars to require additional information to consumers. Consequently, the effect of
these two decisions is to leave neutral or increase the flow of truthful information in the marketplace,
a goal consistent with the first amendment commercial speech doctrine. See infra notes 53-60 and
accompanying text.
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services to consumers of all income classes. 6 The recent Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplina?y CounseP decision reinforces this view by placing the burden of proving
the necessity of restricting an, advertisements of legal services more heavily
upon each state bar association.'
This note will address the issue of whether state bars should retain existing
prohibitions on quality and self-laudatory claims. 9 Since most state disciplinary

6. Canon 2 of the Model Code provides:
The need of members of the public for legal services is met only if they recognize their
legal problems, appreciate the importance of seeking assistance, and are able to obtain the
services of acceptable legal counsel. Hence, important functions of the legal profession are
to educate laymen to recognize their problems, to facilitate the process of intelligent selection
of lawyers, and to assist in making legal services fully available.
Model Code of Professional Conduct EC 2-1 (1980). This duty to make legal services readily
available to the public has been frustrated by the imposition of advertising and solicitation restraints.
Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J.
1181, 1181-91 (1972). For example, advertising restrictions disproportionately affected the middle
income class during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Legal clinics and prepaid legal service plans
developed during this period to more efficiently deliver legal services to the middle class. However,
advertising restraints hindered the promotion of such services, which rely upon a high volume of
clients. See Muris & McChesnay, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services: The Case For
Legal Clinics, 1979 AM. B. FOUND REs. J. 179, 194-95. The Court in Bates based its opinion on studies
demonstrating the existing public recalcitrance to contact an attorney because of fear of high prices
or the general lack of sufficient information to contact a competent attorney. Bates, 433 U.S. at
370. Cf Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763-64 (1976) ("When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do, information as to who is
charging what becomes more than a convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain
or the enjoyment of basic necessities.").
7. 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
8. Id. at 2279-80. "Our recent decisions involving commercial speech have been grounded
in the faith that the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify imposing
on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the helpful from the
misleading, and the harmless from the harmful." Id.
9. There are three major reasons for re-evaluating information restrictions on attorney advertising. First, many states are actively considering amendments to their disciplinary codes. Currently, most state bar association codes of professional responsibility are based on the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, which was supplanted by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983). States are not required to adopt
the Model Rules. Thus, they may retain existing provisions prohibiting claims of quality or selflaudation. Retention of such provisions would not be in the best interests of consumers. See infra
notes 156-75 and accompanying text. Second, many law firms have expanded into the nationwide
provision of legal services. See Nat'l L.J. 250, Sept. 30, 1985, Special Section at S2. The two
largest chains, Jacoby & Meyers and Hyatt Legal Services, increased their number of staff attorneys at annual rates of 50.3 and 45.1 percent respectively. Hyatt, the country's second largest
law firm, with 550 attorneys, expanded from 18 cities in 12 states to 30 cities in 18 states, including Washington, D.C. Jacoby & Meyers, the 41st largest firm, expanded into 3 new states
and opened 60 new offices, becoming the second fastest growing law firm. Id. Because of the
increasing number of law firms operating interstate, legal services advertisements broadcast on a
nationwide network television could enter jurisdictions with conflicting disciplinary codes. Consequendy, the state with the most restrictive advertising restraints becomes the least common denominator effectively determining the limits of an advertiser's commercial speech rights. Whether
such limitations are unduly burdensome under the commerce clause is questionable. The state
interest in developing state standards, similar to the local community standards in obscenity cases,
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codes are currently being revised, state bar associations should eliminate these
broad and vaguely defined information restraints for a number of reasons. First,
neither the courts nor the legal literature have adequately addressed the question
of what constitutes a claim of quality or self-laudation."' With little consistency
in the interpretation of what constitutes such claims, little coherence or uniformity exists in their regulation across state jurisdictions." Second, claims of

might outweigh the burden on commerce. Third, state regulation of attorney advertising potentially
creates 50 different sets of rules to which interstate advertisers must adhere. A uniform national
code similar to the ABA Model Rules would bring consistency and order to the legal services
advertising markets. Proposals for instituting such a system are possible. Such a code, if enforced,
for example, by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or through another agency, should refrain
from prohibitions on quality claims and self-laudatory statements. See also Julin, The Legal Profession:
Education and Entry, in REGULATING THE PROFESSIONS 207 (R. Blair & S. Rubin eds. 1980) (current
rigid state advertising barriers are counterproductive to provision of legal services).
10. The Bates court specifically stated that "we need not address the peculiar problems associated with advertising claims relating to the quality of legal services." 433 U.S. at 366. In
Zauderer, the Court noted that the ads in question lacked any promises relating to the quality of
service. But the opinion stated:
Although our decisions have left open the possibility that States may prevent attorneys
from making non-verifiable claims regarding the quality of their services, they do not
permit a State to prevent an attorney from making accurate statements of fact regarding
the nature of his practice merely because it is possible that some readers will infer that
he has some expertise in those areas.
Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2276 n.9 (citations omitted).
In the federal courts, only a very few cases have addressed the constitutionality of prohibitions
on quality or self-laudatory statements in attorney advertising. See Spencer v. Supreme Court, 579
F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (state's prohibition of terms which subjectively evaluate a lawyer's
credentials or quality of his services is constitutional); Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521
F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (state's prohibition against claims of quality or appeals to emotion,
prejudice, or likes or dislikes of prospective clients is constitutional), vacated, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th
Cir. 1982); Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 604 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1979) (though self-laudatory
statements not easily verifiable, attorney's challenge to restraint on self-laudatory statements not
mooted by Bates).
The number of state cases is equally sparse. No courts have explicitly dealt with the quality
claim issue. Some have, however, addressed challenges to state bar board determinations that
discipline attorneys whose advertisements contain elements of persuasion or self-laudatory claims.
See, e.g., McLellan v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1982) (attorney's ad in
yellow pages not self-laudatory though an attempt to attract attention).
Also, the use of comparative ads and testimonials is self-laudatory and may infer quality.
Because of the increased competition in the provision of routine, standardized legal services, more
law firms will desire to contrast their services and prices with other providers of legal services.
However, most state codes, which are substantially similar to the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, prohibit comparative ads. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
7.1(c) (1983) ("A communication is false or misleading if it compares the lawyer's services with
other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated."). Testimonials have
been prohibited either through direct or indirect regulation. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrT DR 2-103(C) (1980) ("A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to
a person or organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client."). For further
discussion of quality claims see infa notes 198-226 and accompanying text.
11. Courts that have addressed challenges to state bar codes which prohibit quality or selflaudatory claims have applied various tests. Some apply the Central Hudson four-part test described
infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Spencer v. Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp 880
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (prohibition on use of terms which subjectively evaluate a lawyer's credentials or
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quality or self-laudation are totally banned in many jurisdictions.' 2 This prohibition encompasses a broad range of claims which include both truthful and
non-deceptively advertised claims. Consequently, restraint of such claims by
state bar associations is constitutionally questionable. 3 Finally, a major problem
is the consumers' lack of information regarding the availability of adequate legal
the quality of services is least restrictive means of advancing substantial state interest); Lyon v.
Alabama State Bar, 451 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1984) (bar failed to provide substantial interest in
requiring specific listing of court costs), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 385 (1985); Matter of Discipline of Appert,
315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981) (state's interest in prohibiting distribution of written materials not compelling
given less restrictive means exist); In re Von Weigen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d
40 (1984) (blanket prohibition on mail solicitation of accident victims an unconstitutional contentbased restriction), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985). Others invoke the Central Hudson test but
fail to apply it correctly. See, e.g., Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1225
(S.D. Iowa 1981) ("government interest in precluding any possible misleading content in lawyer
advertising is clearly substantial") (emphasis added), vacated, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982) Committee on Prof. Ethics v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 572 (Iowa 1984) (despite recognizing the
Central Hudson test, the majority fails to identify ad as misleading or identify a substantial state
interest) (Larson, J. dissenting), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985), aff'd on rehearing, 377 N.W.2d 643
(1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3585 (1985).
The inconsistent analysis used by the various states is evidenced by the fact courts will apply
different tests to substantially similar advertisements, often resulting in opposite outcomes. Compare
In re Sekerez, 458 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. 1984) (use of trade name, even with practitioner's name
included, can be prohibited to prevent public deception) with In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163,
470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984) (motto "The Country Lawyer" does not violate tradename
prohibition because lawyer's actual name included in ad), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985);
compare Lovett & Linder, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903 (D.R.I. 1981) (disclaimers as to
specialization constitutional) with Spencer v. Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(disclaimers regarding specialization unconstitutional because not the least restrictive method of
preventing misrepresentation). Compare In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981) (claims of
special expertise may be false, deceptive, or misleading representations of a warranty of competence)
with State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Schaffer, 648 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1982) (guarantees of expeditious
legal services not an assurance of quality if within the control of promisor). Consequently, state
regulators committed to restraining suppliers of truthful information have very broad discretion in
the methods of reaching results they may desire.
12. Nineteen states have codes identical or similar to ABA Proposal "B" which prohibits the
use of any public communication which: (1) contains statistical data or other information based on
past performance or prediction of future success; (2) contains a testimonial about or endorsement
of a lawyer; (3) contains a statement of opinion as to the quality of the services or contains a
representation or implication regarding the quality of legal services which is not susceptible of
reasonable verification by the public; (4) appeals primarily to a lay person's fear, greed, desire for
revenge, or similar emotion; (5) is intended or is likely to attract clients by use of showmanship,
puffery, self-laudation or hucksterism, including the use of slogans, jingles, or garish or sensational
language or format. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(C) (1977) (Proposal
"B"). Twenty-nine states have versions identical or similar to the ABA-adopted Proposal "A,"
which deleted the former prohibition on self-laudatory claims but included as an example of deceptive
advertising representations concerning the quality of service which cannot be measured or verified.
L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN: LAWYER ADVERTISINo AND SOLICITATION 97-146 (1980).
13. See infia notes 240-48 and accompanying text. Challenges of bar advertising restrictions
based on void-for-vagueness or overbreadth have generally been unsuccessful. See Spencer v. Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp. 880, 891 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (advertising in a dignified manner is reasonable regulation in furtherance of substantial state interest in maintaining the image and stature
of the legal profession); Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (S.D.
Iowa 1981) (requirement that lawyer advertising be 'dignified' was not unconstitutionally vague
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services.14 To increase the flow of legal information to the public, many bar
associations have attempted to eliminate all elements of persuasion from attorney
advertising.' 5 Ironically, unless attorneys can include persuasive elements in their
advertisements, there is a reduced incentive to provide information on legal

since lawyers should have little difficulty distinguishing a dignified ad from one that is undignified),
vacated, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982). But see Johnson v. Director of Prof. Responsibility, 341
N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1983) (rule prohibiting advertising of legitimate specialization unconstitutionally
overbroad).
14. See generally B. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC (1977) (study analyzing the
public's use of legal services).
15. Effective marketing of any product or service requires sellers to inform and persuade
consumers. However, in legal services markets, state bars have attempted to eliminate any advertising containing persuasive elements. Most states incorporate the outdated ABA Code that also
sought to separate information from persuasion. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNSIBILITY EC 2-8 (1980). "Advertisements and public communications ...should be formulated to
convey only information that is necessary to make an appropriate selection [of a lawyer by a lay
person]." Id. at EC 2-10.
A lawyer should ensure that the information contained in any advertising ...is disseminated
in an objective and understandable fashion, and would facilitate the prospective client's
ability to compare the qualifications of the lawyers available to represent him. A lawyer
should strive to communicate such information without undue emphasis upon style and
advertising strategems which serve to hinder rather than to facilitate intelligent selection
of counsel.
Id.
4
Some state codes prohibit particular manners of advertising. Kansas requires that advertising
be presented in "a dignified manner without use of drawings, illustrations, animations, portrayals,
dramatizations, slogans, music, lyrics or the use of pictures other than a portrait of the individual
lawyer." R. SUP. CT. KAN. 225, DR 2-101(B). In Mississippi, advertisements must avoid professional self-laudatory statements calculated to attract lay clients. They must also be of a dignified
size, may not be in print size greater than 12-point, and must possess a 23-word statement printed
in the largest size found in the advertisement advising readers that prices cannot exceed those
advertised. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MissIssIPPI STATE BAR, DR 2-101, DR
2-102(A)(8) (1978). Many states require that ads provide only information contained in a limited
list. Twenty-eight states have codes similar to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility that
contains such a list. L. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 135-46. Obviously, such a listing precludes dissemination of truthful, although persuasive legal services information. See In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191 (1982).
In Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981), vacated, 686
F.2d 1278 (1982), an attorney sought declaratory relief from Iowa Bar provisions that restrained
the attorney's use of (I) terminology characterizing fees; (2) trademarks, signs, symbols, logos,
graphics, design work or other pictures; (3) the attorney's race; and (4) terms defined by the bar
such as "clinics." The court upheld the prohibitions except for the attorney's race. Id. at 122627. The court did note that truthful, verifiable and restrained adjectives which characterize attorney's
fees could not be prohibited. Id. at 1226.
The court's approach is noteworthy.
In considering plaintiff's challenges to content prohibitions of the Disciplinary Rules
governing lawyer advertising, it should first be observed that most advertising content
consists of two parts, the factual or informational content and the promotional or persuasive
content. Factual content consists of specific definable, measurable, demonstrative matters
and operates at a conscious level. Promotional content, such as modifiers ("best," "quality,"
"competent," "reasonable," "moderate," "cheap," etc.), logos, drawings, sounds, sights,
colors, lighting effects, dramatizations, etc., often operates at the unconscious level. Promotional advertising is potentially deceptive or misleading.
Id. at 1224. The court focused on whether each advertising restriction fulfilled the goal of providing
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services.' 6 Eliminating the prohibition on quality and self-laudatory claims would

not only allow attorneys to persuade consumers to utilize their firm's services
but would also increase the flow of information to the consuming public.
The analysis begins by examining the commercial speech doctrine. 17 This
doctrine mandates competition in the information markets.' 8 This mandate will
be explored from both legal and economic perspectives. Next, the Bales-Zauderer
only "factual" information. Under the court's analysis, advertising which does not "inform" consumers is not protected under the first amendment. For example, the court stated: "Signs and
symbols, such as logos, do not set forth facts or otherwise inform. They are promotional in nature,
and they can be misleading. Therefore, the prohibition against their use in lawyer advertising does
not violate plaintiff's First Amendment right of commercial speech." Id. at 1226 (footnotes omitted).
Cf Zuderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280-81 (State's assertion that the visual content of ad may operate at
subconscious level and create unacceptable risks the public will be misled and manipulated is
unsupported).
The Bishop court's perspective is not unique. See, e.g., Eaton v. Supreme Court, 270 Ark.
573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1980). Attorneys were privately reprimanded
for an advertisement mailed with other ads to a targeted area. The other ads contained coupons
for discounts at local businesses. The attorneys' ad listed a $10 initial consultation fee along with
a series of questions on the need for legal services in broad areas including the query "Other legal
problems?" The court agreed with the Committee of Professional Conduct's opinion that the ad
failed to provide sufficient information to assist one in need of legal services to make an informed
selection. Id. at 59. The court stated the primary purpose of the ad was to urge a group of specific
potential consumers to seek the attorneys' services. Id. "The advertisement here did not meet the
stated purpose of advertising legal services [which is] to provide potential consumers of legal services
with a means of making an informed selection of an attorney." Id. at 60. The ad was "merely
a lure to get customers into the advertiser's place of business." Id.
In Mezrano v. Alabama State Bar, 434 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1983), the court's analysis of the
constitutionality of a mandatory disclaimer is notable. The court stated:
[W]e feel that attorneys' representations about the quality of their legal services could very
well mislead the public. Upon passing the bar examination, all attorneys are presumed to be on an
equalfooting. Thus, the Alabama State Bar could reasonably conclude that attorneys should
not hold themselves out as being superior to other attorneys when there is no rating system
in this state.
Id. at 735 (emphasis added). The court's analysis precluded attorneys from differentiating themselves
on the basis of expertise simply because the state had not created a rating system. See also infra
notes 182-83 and accompanying text (discussing standard-setting as a means of increasing information to consumers).
16. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 27-60 and accompanying text.
18. The commercial speech doctrine has evolved in large part as a response to regulatory
restrictions on the suppliers of information in the consumer marketplace. The primary justifications
for first amendment protection of commercial speech are based upon both the speaker's rights and
the rights of the listeners to receive important information. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, 425 U.S. 748, 762-770 (1976). The rights of the speaker,
although possibly entirely profit-motivated, are also entitled to protection. Id. at 761-62. The foundation of the doctrine finds support in the economic model of perfect competition.
Under perfect competition, buyers and sellers have complete information regarding any material
factors prior to entering an economic transaction. However, in reality the participants in the economic exchange process are less than perfectly informed. See infra notes 141-55 and accompanying
text. In fact, there may be well-developed markets for the exchange of information since the
acquisition of information through search is costly. Buyers who can afford to avoid searching for
information will purchase information in the marketplace. Because information is a scarce resource,
competition in its provision is important in a free market economy. Sellers will also have an incentive
to provide information about their products to consumers. The incentive for producers to disseminate
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line of attorney advertising cases will be examined.' 9 These cases do not directly
address the extent to which quality or self-laudatory claims may be regulated.
They do, however, provide a methodology for courts and state bars to institute
in preserving the public's right to information in the marketplace. An overview
of information economics follows. 2" In particular, this section focuses on the
public's need for more information on attorneys' quality attributes and the
alternative information remedies for providing such information. Next, judicial
decisions addressing claims of quality or self-laudation will be considered. Parallels and divergences between the current first amendment commercial speech
2 1
Finally, this
doctrine and current judicial decisions will then be presented.
and selfon
quality
prohibitions
eliminate
their
note will propose that state bars
laudatory claims. 22 In place of these broad prohibitions, application of infor2
2
mation remedies such as triggered disclosures, ' across the board disclosures '
and 'cooling off' periods2 would provide effective consumer protection26
II.

THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE:
MANDATE

FOR COMPETITION

THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S

IN INFORMATION

MARKETS

The first amendment provides Congress shall make no law abridging the
freedom of speech.2 7 Varying interpretations of what constitutes protected
"speech" under the amendment prevent a general unified theory for application
information about their products is an important factor. Many times information restrictions are
geared to prevent the use of persuasive elements while promoting disclosure of "pure information."
Such a scheme is not compatible with the sellers' incentive to persuade consumers to purchase
their goods or services. See infra notes 26 and 138-55.
19. See infra notes 61-137 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 138-97 and accompanying text.
21.
See infra notes 198-248 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 249-68 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 185-88, 257-68 and accompanying text. Contingent disclosures are required
disclosures of particular information when advertisers make particular claims. These disclosures,
sometimes referred to as triggered disclosures, require that if a particular claim would be misleading
the advertiser must provide additional qualifying information. Mazis, Staelin, Beales & Salop, A
Framework For Evaluating Consumer Information Regulation, 45 J. MARKETING 11, 18-19 (1981). An
example of a contingent disclosure would be a requirement that attorneys advertising their availability on a contingency fee basis also disclose whether percentages are included before or after
the deduction of litigation costs. Se Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2281-82.
24. See infra notes 185-88, 262-68 and accompanying text.
25. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
26. The dissemination of legal information of a general nature benefits all attorneys as well
as consumers. Unfortunately, the incentive for any one attorney to provide such information is
minimal. Provision of this type of information would provide a "free-ride" to other competing
attorneys. Consequently, information that generally educates the lay public is optimally provided
by a bar association that collects mandatory dues. Requiring contributions from all attorneys who
benefit from the advertising reduces the free-rider problem, and the public becomes more knowledgeable about the legal system. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, The Efficient Regulation of Consumer
Information, 24J.L. & ECON. 491, 503-505 (1981). Essentially, advertising restrictions have prohibited
attorneys from providing information except of a general nature. Consequently, it is not surprising
restrictive advertising rules reduce the incentive to provide any legal services information. See infra
notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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of this constitutional mandate. 2 Instead, a bifurcated analysis developed extending protection to two types of speech: political and commercial. Broadly
defined, political speech is the expression or discussion of issues necessary to
maintain an orderly and participatory representative democracy. 29 Some theorists
contend the amendment's sole province is the protection of speech necessary
for preservation of the democratic process." These commentators believe the
recent development of protected commercial speech under first amendment analysis is ill-advised. 3 ' Many other scholars, however, applaud the contemporary
judicial doctrine providing constitutional protection to speech which simply proposes a commercial transaction.3 2 While recognizing that the first amendment
is predicated on the protection of political speech, these commentators maintain
the commercial speech doctrine is fundamentally sound because of the increased
social benefits accruing to a well-informed consumer-oriented populace.3 3 Con-

28. Some scholars have outlined various interpretations of the underlying rationale of the first
amendment. See generally BeVier, The First Amendment and PoliticalSpeech: An Inquiry Into the Substance
and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978) (framers had no coherent theory of freedom
of speech); Bork, Neutral Pinciples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971) (constitutional protection should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political); Emerson, Toward
a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963) (underlying rationale is the freedom
of self-expression); Meildejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245 (constitutional process of self-government underlies first amendment).
29. Alternatively, political speech is discourse that contributes to the process of forming and
expressing the views of the populace reguarding matters of self-government. See, e.g., BeVier, supra
note 28, at 309. However, the scope of political speech is a subject of debate. See A. BICKEL, THE
MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975) (first amendment should protect and indeed encourage speech so
long as it serves to make the political process work); Bork, supra note 28, at 27-28 (only speech
concerned with governmental behavior, policy or personnel); Emerson, supra note 28, at 878-81
(forms of self-expression included in political speech).
30. See, e.g., Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment,.
65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979).
31. Jackson and Jeffries urge there are two basic values of economic liberty: the opportunity
of the individual producer or consumer to maximize his economic utility and the aggregate economic
efficiency of a free market economy. Id. at 25. Since these same values are invaded by most other
instances of governmental regulation, the authors believe Virginia Pharmacy was wrongly decided.
The Virginia Pharmacy Court simply "reconstituted the values of Lochner v. New York as components
of freedom of speech". Id. at 30-31. The authors assert the core principle underlying the first
amendment is the protection of speech that contributes to self-government or nurtures the realization
of the individual personality. Id. at 14. They conclude that "[w]hatever else it may mean, the
concept of a first amendment right to personal autonomy in matters of belief and expression stops
short of a seller hawking his wares." Id.
32. See, e.g., Coase, Advertising and Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 8 (1977) (advertising is
clearly part of the market for ideas); Kushner, Freedom to Hear: The First Amendment, Commercial
Speech and Access to Information, 28 WAYNE L. REv. 137, 172-79 (1981).
33. Kushner, supra note 32, at 139-42. The author states:
What is of greater importance to the individual, hearing a discourse on Marxist thought
or obtaining information necessary to satisfy immediate human needs such as employment,
medical care, the most affordable housing and drug prices or how to resolve a legal dispute?
While to suppress the former would present a direct threat to the concept of liberty to
all, the suppression of commercial information directly and dramatically affects all of society,
particularly the poor and those of moderate income.
Id. at 141.
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sequently, the difference between the two positions seems to be one of purpose
versus effect."
Historically, commercial speech received no protection under the first amendment." In 1976, the Supreme Court squarely confronted the issue. In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,"I consumers of prescription drugs challenged the validity of a Virginia statute declaring the advertising of prescription drug prices by licensed pharmacists to be unprofessional.
Finding that the consuming public may receive drug price information, the
Court held the first amendment protects commercial speech. 7 The right to
receive information is founded upon the fundamental tenets of a free enterprise
economy.
Additionally, the Court reasoned that barring these advertisements
was highly paternalistic. 9 Neither the state nor the Supreme Court should de34. Advocates who focus on the original purpose of the first amendment argue that extension
of constitutional protection to commercial speech neither promotes individual self-fulfillment through
free expression nor contributes to political decision-making in a representative democracy. See, e.g.,
Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 30, at 14. In contrast, the foundation of the commercial speech
doctrine in large part rests upon the beneficial economic effects from the flow of truthful information
in commercial markets. See Kushner, supra note 32, at 175. Also, the distinction between commercial
and political speech is somewhat muddled. Political speech theorists urge that principles of selfgovernment and individual free-expression are protected under the first amendment. See supra notes
30-33 and accompanying text. But the value of self-government assumes a reasoning and knowledgeable electorate. Consequently, the individual opportunity to actively participate in those decisions
which significantly affect the quality of one's own life is a primary tenet of free-speech. Kushner,
supra note 32, at 175. The fact that matters concerning personal economic choices in private sectors
tend to more directly affect individuals than other types of individual decisions indicates that commercial speech may be a prerequisite to effective political speech. See, e.g., Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
429 (1971). The Supreme Court in Virginia Pharmacy even noted that an individual advertisement,
though entirely "commercial," may be of general public interest since there is a societal interest
in the free flow of commercial information. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 764 (1976). The Court intimated that "even if the First Amendment were thought to be primarily a instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a democracy,
[the court] could not say that the free flow of information does not serve that goal." Id. at 765.
35. The Supreme Court refused to extend protection to commercial speech in Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (circular with commercial advertising message on one side and
political protest on the other could be prohibited as a regulation of business activity). That same
year, the Court carved out another class of unprotected speech. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court held that "fighting words" were not constitutionally protected.
Additional examples of excepted classes of unprotected speech are obscenity, defamation and incitement. The basis for not extending constitutional protection to such speech rests upon the belief
that certain categories of speech are not essential to the exposition of ideas. 315 U.S. at 571-72.
36. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
37. "As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that
interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate." Id. at 763.
38. The Court stated:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It
is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well
informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial information is indispensable.
Id.
39. Id. at 770. The state argued that price advertising could jeopardize pharmacists' expertise
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termine the consumers' choice of pharmaceuticals in various price and quality
combinations. 40
The Court also noted a state may regulate the quality of professional services
provided by pharmacists. 4' But states cannot constitutionally regulate professional standards by restricting advertisements on drug prices. The state may
not foster consumers' ignorance of the entirely lawful terms competing pharmacists offer for their services. 42 The Court concluded that a state may not
completely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful information about
entirely lawful activity for fear of the information's effect upon disseminators

or recipients. 4
Virginia Pharmacy intimated that since commercial speech is distinguishable
from other types of speech, a different degree of protection may be warranted
to ensure the unimpaired dissemination of truthful and legitimate commercial
information. 4 4 In the four years following Virginia Pharmacy, the Court considered
whether the degree of protection afforded truthful commercial speech was sub-

and ultimately consumers' health. The more painstaking and conscientious pharmacist would be
forced to cut cormers and possibly go out of business trying to compete with pharmacists who
advertise. Id. at 768. The state also urged that the advertising ban protects the professional image
of the pharmacist, reinforcing the better habits of those who are in the profession. Id. The Court
dismissed these justifications asserting "[t]he advertising ban does not directly affect professional
standards one way or the other." Id. at 769. Noting the state already closely regulates the practice
of pharmacy, the Court found no connection between banning drug price advertising and the
prevention of corner-cutting by pharmacists. Id. In fact, the only effect the advertising ban had
on pharmacists was to insulate them from price competition and to open the way for substantial
or excessive profits while providing an inferior product. Id. The Court's approach assumed that
drug price information is not in itself harmful and that consumers will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed. Therefore, opening up the channels of communication would promote consumer interests. Id. at 770.
40. Id. "[T]he choice among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or the Virginia
General Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of choice, between dangers of suppressing information,
and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us."
Id. at 770.
41. Id. "Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists;
it may subsidize them or protect them from competition in other ways." Id.
-42. Id.
43. Id. at 773. However, the Court reserved judgment on other related questions. The case
considered only the regulation of commercial advertising by pharmacists. Expressing no opinion as
to other professions, the Court noted the historical and functional distinctions between professions
may require consideration of quite different factors. "Physicians and lawyers, for example, do not
dispense standardized products; they render professional services of almost infinite variety and nature
with the consequent enhanced possibility for confusion and deception if they were to undertake
certain kinds of advertising." Id. at 773 n.25. The Bales-Zauderer line of cases indicates the Court's
opinion on some of the questions left open in Virginia Pharmacy. See notes 61-137 infra and accompanying text.
44. Id. at 771 n.24. "The truth of commercial information ... may be more easily verifiable
by its disseminator than let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the
advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself
provides and presumably knows more about than anyone else." Id. Additionally, the Court noted
that commercial messages may appropriately be required to appear in such a form, or include such
additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as is necessary to prevent deception. Id.
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stantially different from other forms of protected speech. 5 The genesis of the
contemporary judicial test defining the limitations on governmental regulation
of commercial speech originated during this period.
In 1980, the Court announced the contemporary test allowing state regulation of truthful commercial information only under certain conditions. In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 6 the Public Service
Commission of New York completely banned promotional advertising by electric
utilities. The state argued that conserving energy and ensuring fair and effective
4
electricity rates justified the total prohibition7.
Finding the ban unconstitutional,
4
the Court applied a four-part analysis. s First, the commercial speech must not
be misleading nor concern unlawful activity. 4' Next, the asserted governmental
interest must be substantial. If both conditions are met, the regulation must
directly advance the asserted interest and be no more extensive than necessary."
The Court found the asserted state interests substantial. However, the connection between prohibiting advertisements and the state's interest in ensuring
fair and efficient rates was too tenuous and speculative.' Also, the ban, although
directly related to the state's interest in conserving energy, was more extensive
than necessary- 2 Consequently, the advertising prohibition failed the third and
fourth parts of the test.
Two conclusions may be drawn from Virginia Pharmacy and the enunciation
of the Central Hudson four-part test. First, the commercial speech doctrine is
intended to protect the free flow of information throughout the economy."
Essentially, a competitive free-market economy requires informed consumers and
producers. 4 The commercial speech doctrine mandates the provision of the
greatest amount of information at the least possible cost to society." Only with

45. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978); Bates, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Linmark Assoc. Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
46. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
47. Id. at 568.
48. Id. at 564.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 566.
51. Id. at 568-69.
52. Id. at 569-571.
53. Id. at 562-63; Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-65.
54. 425 U.S. at 765.
55. In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court cited an FTC Study predicting that the effects of a free
flow of drug price information would have "a very substantial magnitude, amounting to many
millions of dollars per year." Id. at 765 n.20. A 1976 study estimated the dollar effect of removing
advertising restrictions in the prescription drug markets. The study concluded that "[rlestrictions
on prescription drug advertising result in monopoly returns estimated at between $135 and $152
million as best estimates, (almost 4 percent of total prescription sales) in 1970. These returns take
the form of an income transfer, in the form of higher prices, from drug purchasers to retail sellers."
Cady, An Estimate of the Price Effects of Restrictions on Drug Price Advertising, 14 EcoN. INQUIRY 493,
510 (1976). These studies estimate the savings to consumers who purchase prescription drugs at
the lower prices resulting from competitive advertising. More difficult to measure, yet also a saving
to society, is the reduction in search costs to consumers. With advertising restrictions, consumer
search is very costly since consumers must contact each seller individually to determine market
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a substantial interest may the state regulate suppliers of truthful information.
Furthermore, the method of regulating information must be directly related to
the interest and be no more extensive than necessary. This contemporary judicial
test provides a significant degree of protection approaching that provided political speech.5 6 The placement of the substantial burden upon states recognizes
the overriding interest in maintaining a competitive economy in the product,
service, and information markets.
Second, the first amendment is not absolute. False, misleading or deceptive
commercial messages that impose costs on society and distort consumer perceptions do not receive first amendment protection. 5 7 In certain instances, ad-

prices. Consumers have to spend more time and effort searching since competing prices are not

readily available. Consequently, a secondary saving implicit in Virginia Pharmacy is the reduction
of consumer search costs. See infra notes 138-55 and accompanying text.
56. Clearly, freedom of speech rights are not absolute in most contexts. Speech that imposes
undesirable results on society is not immune from government regulation. Commerical speech
analysis, though still in its infancy, has expanded to protect many forms of commercial expression.
In less than a decade, truthful commercial speech has been elevated from an unprotected status
to a position requiring a narrowly tailored substantial state interest to justify regulation. See supra
notes 35-56 and accompanying text.
However, substantial differences exist between commercial and political speech. First the overbreadth doctrine has not been applied to commercial speech. In Bates, the Court held that the
traditional rationales for applying the overbreadth doctrine were absent in the context of professional
advertising. 433 U.S. at 379-82. "The reason for the special rule in First Amendment cases is
apparent: An overbroad statute might serve to chill protected speech." Id. at 380. The Court
continued:
Since advertising is linked to commercial well-being, it seems unlikely that such speech is
particularly susceptible to being crushed by overbroad regulation. Moreover, concerns for
uncertainty in determining the scope of protection are reduced; the advertiser seeks to
disseminate information about a product or service that he provides and presumably he
can determine more readily than others whether his speech is truthful and protected.
Id. at 381. However, protected speech may be chilled without the availability of the overbreadth
doctrine. The doctrine simply allows a claimant to assert that others' speech may be unconstitutionally squelched by an overbroad regulation without demonstrating that claimant's own speech
was protected. In the commercial speech context, a regulation may be overly broad, effectively
suppressing or chilling protected speech, but a claimant must demonstrate that ihe regulation violates
claimant's own rights. See Id. at 379-81.
A second difference lies in the allocation of the burden of proof. After Bates and R.M.J. the
question of which party, the state bar or the reprimanded attorney, should shoulder the burden
remains. In both cases, there are indications that the bar must demonstrate that an advertisement
in question was unprotected speech. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 382 ("We conclude that it has not been
demonstrated that the advertisement at issue could be suppressed [by the bar]."); In re R.M.J.,
455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982) ("There is no finding that appellant's speech was misleading"). While
the burden is clearly on the state to prove the constitutionality of its speech regulation in the noncommercial context, it is not so clear in the commercial context. See, e.g., Lyon v. Alabama State
Bar, 451 So. 2d 1367, 1370-71 (Ala. 1984) (absent a clear mandate to the contrary, bar has the
burden in a disciplinary hearing to show evidence that lawyer violated the rules). However, Zauderer
indicates the burden now clearly rests upon the bar. 105 S. Ct. at 2280. ("[T]he burden is on
the State to present a substantial governmental interest justifying the restriction [of truthful speech]
as applied to appellant and to demonstrate that the restriction vindicates that interest through the
least restrictive available means.") (emphasis added).
57. See Holmes, FTC Regulation of Unfair or Deceptive Advertising: Current Status of the Law, 30
DE

PAUL

L. REv. 549 (1981). Particular types of advertising practices have been held unlawful:
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vertisers' economic motivations for disseminating false information are clear.
Commercial enterprises not relying upon repeat business nor having an interest
in maintaining credible reputations may profit from deceiving the public." In
such cases, false, misleading or deceptive information should be prohibited."
However, since most business enterprises strive to maintain or expand their
existing clientele while developing a strong reputation, prophylactic rules are
60
generally inappropriate.
III.

ATTORNEY

ADVERTISING:

FROM Bates to Zauderer

The commercial speech analysis of attorney advertising must begin with the
landmark decision in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona. 61 One year after Virginia
Pharmacy, the Supreme Court extended constitutional protection to the advertising of routine legal matters. In Bates, the Arizona Bar alleged that a newspaper
ad for a "legal clinic" advertising certain "legal services at very reasonable
fees" violated the state supreme court's disciplinary rule prohibiting advertisements. 62 Emphasizing the strong societal interest in maintaining the free flow
of commercial information, the Court considered the necessity of different constitutional considerations when analyzing commercial advertising by different
63
professions.
The Arizona Bar offered six justifications for banning legal advertising:
(1) attorney advertising would erode professionalism by tarnishing the dignified
public image of attorneys; 64 (2) attorney advertising is inherently mislead-

(I) directly false or misleading advertisements; (2) impliedly false or misleading advertisements; (3)
advertisements that fail to disclose material, unsubstantiated advertising claims; and (4) unfair
advertisements that are not deceptive. Id. at 563-79.
58. See Jordan & Rubin, An Economic Analysis of the Law of False Advertising, 8. J. LEGAL STUD.
527, 527-30 (1979).
59. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563 ("there can be no constitutional objection to the
suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public about lawful activity");
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (state has substantial interest in protecting public from
deceptive and misleading use of tradenames); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 447,
464-65 (1978) (propflylactic rule prohibiting in-person solicitation held constitutional).
60. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2277, 2279-80. The substantial state interests in preventing coercive
in-person solicitation identified in Ohralik are not present in print advertisements. Id. at 2277. Therefore,
regulation of the print media through prophylactic rules is inappropriate. Id. Also, since the Court's recent
decisions have been "grounded in the faith that the free flow of information is valuable enough
to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false,
the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful," prophylactic restraints are
unacceptable. Id. at 2279-80. "[B]road prophylactic rules may not be so lightly justified if the
protections afforded commercial speech are to retain their force." Id. at 2281. The Court noted
prophylactic restraints were particularly inappropriate in legal services markets because the value
of consumers' knowing their legal rights equals or exceeds the value of other types of commercial
information. Id. at 2280.
61. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
62. Id. at 354-56.
63. Id. at 366.
64. Id. at 368-72. The Bar urged that advertising would commercialize the profession transforming it into a mere "trade." Id. at 368. Dismissing this asserted justification, the Court noted
that the failure of lawyers to advertise may actually create public disillusionment with the profession.
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ing;6 5 (3) attorney advertising would adversely affect the administration of justice; 66
67
(5) advertising would
(4) advertising results in undesirable economic effects;
Id. at 370. In particular, "[sjtudies reveal that many persons do not obtain counsel even when
they perceive a need because of the feared price of services or because of an inability to locate a
competent attorney." Id. (footnotes omitted).
65. Id. at 372-75. The Bar asserted that consumers, who are unable to determine in advance
just what services they need, cannot adequately compare legal services because such services are
so individualized. Id. at 372. In addition, the Bar felt attorneys would highlight irrelevant factors
in their ads rather than relevant factors such as their skills. Id. The Court rejected these arguments
relying upon the sophistication of consumers to make intelligent decisions. Because legal services
range from the simple to the complex, many standardizable services lend themselves to advertising
oftentimes at fixed prices. Id. at 373. The Court pointed out that the state bar actually sponsors
a Legal Services Program in which routine services are performed at standardized prices. Id.
The dissent argued that attorney advertising is misleading because the exact services in an
advertised package may be misunderstood by prospective clients. Id. at 392-93 (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The majority responded by stating:
We recognize that an occasional client might fail to appreciate the complexity of his legal
problem and will visit an attorney in the mistaken belief that his difficulty can be handled
at the advertised price. The misunderstanding, however, usually will be exposed at the
initial consultation, and an ethical attorney would impose, at the most, a minimal consultation charge or no charge at all for the discussion. If the client decides to have work
performed, a fee could be negotiated in the normal manner. The client is thus in largely
the same position as he would have been if there were no advertising. In light of the
benefits of advertising to those whose problems can be resolved at the advertised price,
suppression is not warranted on account of the occasional client who misperceives his legal
difficulties.
rd. at 373 n.28; see also Smith & Cox, The Pi ing of Legal Services: A Contractual Solution to the Problem
of Bilateral Opportunism, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 167 (1985) (potential clients have an incentive to understate the complexity of their situations with fixed-fees while with hourly rates, law firms have
the incentive to overstate the hours required to perform services rendered).
66. Bates, 433 U.S. at 376-77. The Bar's concern focused on the increased burden advertising
would have on the court system by stirring up additional and sometimes fraudulent claims. Id. at
376. However, the Court was unwilling to accept such a justification, stating the problem of underutilization of legal services by the middle 70% of the population could be ameliorated by advertising.
The Court noted: "Advertising is the traditional mechanism in a free-market economy for a supplier
to inform a potential purchaser of the availability and terms of exchange. [The advertising ban]
has served to burden access to legal services, particularly for the not-quite-poor and the unknowledgeable." Id. at 376-77.
Many studies have documented the underutilization of legal services. See generally B. CURRAN,
supra note 14. This ABA-ABF sponsored study surveyed approximately 2000 consumers (738 nonusers of legal services, 582 one-time users and 743 multiple users). The study identified reasons
why people do not consult an attorney, even when they recognize they have a serious legal problem.
First, 68% agreed that most lawyers charge more for their services than they are worth. Id. at
231. Eighty-two percent believed that many legal matters can be handled less expensively by nonlawyers. Id. Second, 82% agreed that people do not go to lawyers because they have no way of
knowing which lawyer is competent to handle their particular problem. Id. at 235.
67. Bates, 433 U.S. at 377-78. The Bar claimed that advertising would raise legal costs and
create entry barriers to young attorneys. Id. Citing empirical studies demonstrating the benefits of
price advertising, the Court noted the incentive to price competitively decreases when advertising
is prohibited. Id. at 377. The Court pointed out the advertising ban serves only to perpetuate the
market position of established firms by forcing consumers to rely upon reputational information
within a community. Id. at 378.
Reputation is an important source of consumer information. Reputational information is generally trustworthy because it comes from reliable sources such as friends and acquaintances. It is

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

15

Florida Law
Review, Vol.
37,
Iss. 5 [1985],
UNIVERSITY
OF FLORIDA
LA W
REVIEW

Art. [Vol.
3

XXXVII

adversely affect the quality of legal services; 68 and (6) any advertising restraint
short of a total ban would be unduly burdensome. 69 Rejecting the proffered
justifications, the Court raised a number of important points. First, since legal
services are essentially market commodities, 70 correct but incomplete information, as compared with consumer ignorance, facilitates the informed selection
of an attorney. 7' Essentially, a presumption exists favoring more rather than
also acquired at low cost. Consequently, opponents of attorney advertising assert that reputation
is a reliable medium of information. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to
Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1096 (1983). However, many
prospective purchasers of legal services do not have access to reputational information. In fact,
sources of reputational information such as personal contact with an attorney or those who frequently
use legal services "is concentrated most heavily among whites and property owners with high
incomes and better education. Thus, nonwhites and persons of low and middle socioeconomic status
usually have fewer sources of reputation information about legal services." Id. at 1096; see also
Forbus, Information and the Economic of the Legal Servieces Industry in Arkansas 32 ARK. L. REV. 723,
739 (1979) (study finding significant barriers preventing full participation of low- and middle-income
families in the legal system).
68. Bates, 433 U.S. at 378-79. In dismissing this asserted justification, the Court stated that
clinics that emphasize the use of standardized procedures for routine problems may actually increase
the quality of legal services by reducing the likelihood of error. Id. See also McChesney & Muris, The
Effect of Advertising on the Quality of Legal Services, 65 A.B.FouND RESEARCH J. 1503 (1979). The
authors' empirical study showed that client's perceived quality rankings of services provided by
traditional firms versus legal clinics was higher for the legal clinics. Id. at 1506. The results revealed
systematic, statistically significant differences between traditional firms and legal clinics. Id. at 1505.
The legal clinics scored higher in all of the following attributes: (1) promptness in taking care of
matters; (2) interest and concern about client's problem; (3) honesty in dealing with client; (4)
explaining matters fully to client; (5) keeping client informed of progress; (6) paying attention to
what client had to say; and (7) being fair and reasonable in charging for services. Id. Of course,
the empirical definition of what constitutes quality is the subject of considerable debate. See FTC
STAFF REPORT, IMPROVING CONSUMER AccEss

TO LEGAL SERVICES: THE CASE FOR REMOVING

RE-

128-31(1984) (besides measurements of attorney quality such
as the client's level of satisfaction, review by peers, minutes spent with client, etc. there are imperfect
quality surrogates such as Martindale-Hubbell ratings and malpractice insurance rates)[hereinafter
cited as FTC STAFF REPORT].
69. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379. The Bar urged that "[blecause the public lacks sophistication in
legal matters, it may be particularly susceptible to misleading or deceptive advertising by lawyers."
Id. However, the Court found this justification unpersuasive. Relying upon the proposition that
almost all attorneys will abide by their oaths to uphold the integrity of the legal profession, the
Court held that self-regulation by the attorneys themselves would effectively minimize the Bar's
asserted enforcement difficulties. Id. The Court stated "[flor every attorney who overreaches through
advertising, there will be thousands of others who will be candid honest, and straightforward."
Id.; see also infra notes 193-97, 220-26 and accompanying text, discussing the economics of selfregulation in information markets.
70. Bates, 433 U.S. at 372. Most commentators agree that the provision of legal services is
indeed a market commodity. See, e.g., Hazard, Pearce & Stemple, Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to
Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084 (1983). In addition, legal
services fit into the broad categories as "standardizable" and "individualized." Id. at 1089-90. Cf
In re Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 638 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn. 1978). "The law is
an ancient, honorable and learned profession and its practitioners are not tradesmen in the marketplace. The role of the huckster, the hawkster, the haggler and the peddler ill becomes a member
of a dignified profession." Id. at 641.
71. Bates, 433 U.S. at 374-75. The Court stated that "it seems peculiar to deny the consumer,
on the ground that the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed
STRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL INFORMATION
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less information in the marketplace. 72
Second, the Court found an advertising ban inconsistent with the Bar's
obligation to make legal services fully available to consumers of all income
classes. 73 Noting the underutilization of legal services, 74 the Court stated that
75
individuals should seek legal redress for their injuries rather than suffer silently.
76
Third, advertising restrictions are ineffective in deterring inferior work. The
Court dismissed the notion that advertising would adversely affect the quality
of legal services by stating "[a]n attorney who is inclined to cut quality will
'77
do so regardless of the rule on advertising."
The Court balanced its rejection of the Bar's asserted interests by enunciating
areas and manners in which advertising regulations could be imposed. First,
false, misleading or deceptive advertising remains unprotected. 7 In particular,
the Court noted that quality claims which are not susceptible to measurement
or verification may warrant regulation. 79 Warnings or disclaimers may also be
required to assure consumers are not misled.80 Noting the embryonic state of
attorney advertising, the Court placed such advertisements in a class of protected
speech that does not enjoy the full protection afforded most other types of
commercial speech. 8'
Many bar associations narrowly interpreted Bates and imposed the most
restrictive advertising rules, thereby evidencing minimal adherence to the Court's
potentially broader mandate.8 2 Many states allowed print advertisements in
newspapers which included only the attorney's name, address, and phone number. 3 In 1977, the American Bar Association (ABA) set up a Task Force on
to reach an informed decision. The alternative - the prohibition of advertising - serves only to
restrict the information that flows to consumers." Id. at 374.
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in part, disagreed. He stated:
Because legal services can rarely, if ever, be "standardized" and because potential clients
rarely know in advance what services they in fact need, price advertising can never give
the public an accurate picture on which to base its selection of an attorney. Indeed, in
the context of legal services, such incomplete information could be worse than no information at all. It could be a trap for the unwary.
Id. at 386-87.
72. Id. at 375. The Court stated "the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less."
Id.
73. Id. at 377.
74. Id. See generally B. CURRAN, supra note 14.
75. Bates, 433 U.S. at 376.
76. Id. at 378.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 363.
79. Id. at 383-84.
80. Id. at 384.
81. The Chief Justice stated that the twin goals of informing and protecting the public are
best served by permitting the organized bar to experiment with and perfect programs. Id. at 38889.
82. States' responses varied but most consistently restricted allowable information disseminations. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 68 (documenting the cautious evolution of attorney
advertising).
83. In 1976, the Section of Economies of Law Practice recommended, and the ABA substantially adopted, a proposal allowing limited listings of designated information in reputable law
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Lawyer Advertising to respond to Bates. 8 Two alternative amendments to the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, proposals A and B, were suggested. "'
Despite substantive criticism,86 the proposals were circulated to state bars. Approximately thirty states subsequently adopted ABA-recommended proposal A." 7
Concurrently, the ABA undertook a total re-evaluation of the entire Model
Code.88 In 1983, the Commission on the Evaluation of Professional Standards
proposed the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that would eliminate almost
all advertising restrictions other than those of a false, misleading or deceptive
nature.8 9
Certain types of conduct, such as solicitations involving elements of free
speech, may warrant regulation."' In the year following Bates, the Court upheld
a ban on solicitation as a legitimate and important state interest in preventing
fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of "vex-

lists, directories and publications by bona fideconsumer organizations. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-102(A)(5) (1976). Also included were limited ads in classified sections
of telephone books. Id. DR 2-102(A)(6). Newspaper and other media were not included. Id. DR
2-101; see also L. ANDREWS, supra note 12.
Since the Supreme Court decision in Bates, 48 states and the District of Columbia have
amended their advertising rules. But many of these rules restrict attorneys from advertising
the type of information that would be most useful in helping the average citizen decide
whether his problem required legal services and who best could provide those services.
Moreover, some rules so restrict effective advertising that attorneys might find it economically
unfeasible to advertise, thus depriving the public of any information whatsoever. The
restrictiveness of the state rules is highlighted by the fact that the very ad in Bates would
not be permissible in 26 states or under the ABA model code.
Id. at 43; see, e.g., CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MISSISSIPPI STATE BAR DR 2101 (1978) (ads of a dignified size required to be in print size no greater than 12-point in newspapers
or yellow pages only).
84. ABA Report of the Board of Governors to the House of Delegates Concerning Lawyer
Advertising, reprinted in ABA Code of Professional Responsibility Amendments, 46 U.S.L.W. 1 (1977).
85. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 97-134.
86. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 68, at 34-35 (noting that consumer groups and the
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, objected to the ABA proposals).
87. Id. at 135-46.
88. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 68, at 35-36 (documenting ABA response to Bates
decision).
89. In 1977, the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, sometimes referred to
as the Kutak Commission, began drafting proposals to modify the Model Code. The Model Rules
of Professional Conduct are the result of 7 years of Commission work. Rule 7.1, Communications
Concerning a Lawyer's Services, provides:
A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the
lawyer's services. A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to
make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about the results the lawyer can achieve,
or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the rules of
professional conduct or other law;
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison
can be factually substantiated.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1983).
90. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-58 (1978).
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atious" conduct. 91 In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association,92 a classic case of
"ambulance chasing," the Court noted the state's interest in maintaining ethical
standards for the protection of clients also furthered the goals of "true professionalism.'' 93 The Court allowed a prophylactic rule to prevent attorneys from
placing consumers in situations that might hinder informed decisionmaking. 94
The Court's decision provided bar associations with useful language to assert
justifications for preserving advertising restrictions. Consequently, the expansion
of attorney advertising progressed slowly.
The laggardly manner in which states revised their codes of professional
conduct demonstrated a grudging acceptance of attorney advertising. In 1980,
95
the ad in Bates would have violated the code provisions of twenty-seven states.
Most states retained highly restrictive advertising rules, with many even more
restrictive than the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 96 Many of
these restrictive codes were, however, constitutionally suspect. In 1982, an attorney who had been privately reprimanded for violating a Missouri Supreme
Court rule regulating attorney advertising challenged the rule's constitutionality.
In In re R.M.J.,9 the challenged rule, modeled after ABA proposal A, prohibited: (a) deviations from a precise listing of areas of practice; (b) listings of
jurisdictions in which an attorney was licensed to practice; and (c) mailing of
cards announcing the opening of an office to persons other than lawyers, clients,
former clients, personal friends and relatives. 9 Holding the rule unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court adopted the Central Hudson four-part analysis and presented
a summary of the commercial speech doctrine within the context of professional
services. 9
First, when the particular content or method of advertising is inherently
misleading or experience has shown it is subject to abuse; states may impose
appropriate restrictions. 00 However, an absolute prohibition on certain types of
potentially misleading information is unconstitutional if the information may be
presented in a way that is not deceptive.' 0 ' Restrictions on advertising may not
be -broader than reasonably necessary to prevent deception. 0 2 Relying on Central
Hudson, the Court held a state must assert a substantial interest to restrict nonmisleading communications. 0 3 In addition, interference with the communication
91. Id. at 462. In a companion case, In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), the Court held
that solicitation of prospective clients by a nonprofit organization that engages in litigation as a

form of political expression is associational conduct protected under the first amendment. 436 U.S.
at 428-29.
92.

436 U.S. 447 (1978).

93.
94.

Id. at 460-61.
Id. at 465-66.

95.

See L. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 43.

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 135-46.
455 U.S. 191 (1982).
Id. at 193-97.
Id. at 203-07.
Id. at 203.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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must be proportionate to the interest served. "14
The R.M.J. decision reinforced the mandate for increased flow of truthful
legal services information in commercial markets. The Court's strongly written
opinion indicated a presumption in favor of uninhibited information markets.'"
Noting none of the asserted justifications for prohibiting advertisements in Bates
approached an interest substantial enough to restrain speech, the Court held
any restrictions must be narrowly drawn."0 6 Furthermore, the state may regulate
0 7
only to the extent such regulation furthers a substantial state interest.1
The Court's most recent pronouncement regarding attorney advertising arose
in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.'") An Ohio attorney had run two
newspaper ads."'9 One advised readers that his firm would represent defendants
charged with drunk driving.'"' The ad stated the client's full legal fee would
be refunded if the client was convicted of drunk driving."' A second ad publicized the attorney's willingness to represent women injured by use of the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD)." 2 The ad contained a
drawing of the device along with the following information: (a) the Dalkon
Shield had been alleged to have caused a number of serious injuries; (b) readers
should not assume the time for taking legal action had passed; (c) the law firm
currently represented others in similar cases; and (d) representation would be
on a contingency fee basis."' The Ohio Disciplinary Council claimed the drunk
104. Id.
105. Compare Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466 (1978) ("it is not unreasonable for the State to presume
that in-person solicitation by lawyers more often than not will be injurious to the person solicited")
with R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 207 ("States retain the authority to regulate advertising that is inherently
misleading or that has proved to be misleading in practice"). R.M.J. and Zauderer replace the
tentative language of Bates and Ohralik with a clear directive indicating the substantial burden placed
on state bars. See Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2279-80 (burden on regulators to distinguish truthful from
false information).

106.
107.

455 U.S. at 203, 206.
Id. at 203.

108.

105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).

109.
110.

Id. at 2271-72.
Id. at 2271.

111.

Id. at 2271-72. After two days, the attorney withdrew the ad following notification by

the Disciplinary Council that it violated a rule prohibiting the use of contingency fees in criminal
cases. Id. The bar relied upon Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B)(15) which provides that contingency fee
rates may be listed provided that the statement discloses whether percentages are computed before
or after deduction of court costs and expenses. Appellant's ad stated: "The cases are handled on
a contingency fee basis of the amount recovered. If there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed
by our clients." Id. at 2272. No contingency fee rate was listed in the ad. Justice Brennan dissented
noting that because appellant's ad merely stated the availability of legal services on a contingency
fee basis, but did not disclose any specific percentage, the state violated appellant's due process
rights by reprimanding him for failure to fully disclose the terms of his fee arrangement. Id. at
2289. "Ohio's disciplinary rules do not 'on [their] face require any disclosures except when an
advertisement mentions contingency fee rates.' " Id. at 2289 (quoting Zauderer, 105 S. Ct at 2283
n.15). Appellant's ad did not mention any particular contingency fee rate; appellant even contacted
government officials before publishing his ad, unsuccessfully seeking to determine whether it would
be ethically objectionable. Id. at 2289. So, the state deprived appellant of his due process guarantees
by failing to set reasonably clear conduct standards. Id. at 2290-91.

112.
113.

Id. at 2272.
Id. at 2271-72.
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driving ad was false, fraudulent, misleading and deceptive. 114 The Council further alleged the IUD ad violated rules (a) prohibiting the use of illustrations;
(b) prohibiting 'undignified' ads; (c) prohibiting information other than the
twenty specific listed types; (d) prohibiting an attorney from soliciting laymen
who have not sought his advice regarding employment; (e) prohibiting an attorney from representing laymen to whom the attorney gave unsolicited legal
advice; and () requiring disclosure of whether contingency fees are calculated
before or after deduction of court costs and expenses." 5
In a plurality decision,"16 the Court held the prohibition on the solicitation
of legal business through ads containing advice and information on specific legal
problems unconstitutional.' ' 7 The IUD ad contained accurate information.""
Therefore, the state shouldered the burden of establishing that the prohibition
of unsolicited advice to obtain legal business directly advanced a substantial
state interest."19 In support of the prohibition, the Disciplinary Council asserted
interests similar to those rejected in Bates.' 20 First, the rule prevented ads which
might promote litigation by encouraging others to file lawsuits. The Court noted
this interest served only to interfere with access to the courts since consumers
were denied accurate information about their legal rights.' 2 ' Second, because
of the indeterminacy of statements about legal problems, a prophylactic rule
was necessary to distinguish between accurate and false and misleading statements.12 The Court based its rejection of this assertion on previous caselaw
eliminating unfair or deceptive practices.' 23 Distinguishing between deceptive
and nondeceptive commercial advertising may require a resolution of complex
and technical factual issues.' 24 As a result, the Court rejected the rule's elusive
25
qualitative distinction between accurate and false and misleading statements.'
114. Id. at 2272-73.
115. Id. at 2272-73.
116. Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court in which Justices Blackmun and Stevens
joined. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented regarding the disclosure requirement
relating to contingency fees. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor,
concurred only in the disclosure requirement. Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
117.

Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280.

118.
119.

Id. at 2276.
Id. at 2275.

120.

Id. at 2277, 2278-80 (stirring up litigation and prophylactic rules).

121. Id. at 2277-78. The Court stated:
To be sure, some citizens, accurately informed of their legal rights, may file lawsuits that
ultimately turn out not to be meritorious. But the State is not entitled to prejudge the
merits of its citizens' claims by choking off access to information that may be useful to
its citizens in deciding to press those claims in court.
Id. at 2279 n.12.
122. Id. at 2278.
123. Id. at 2279.
124. Id. The Court cited Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(corrective advertising ordered to counteract fifty years of false advertising), and National Comm'n
on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977) (industry trade association prevented from
claiming there was no scientific evidence of health risks when issue was in dispute), as examples
of FTC determinations of unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 105 S. Ct. at 2279.
125. 105 S. Ct. at 2271-80. The Court noted that both the ABA and the FTC share the view
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Addressing the State's asserted interest in maintaining professional dignity,
the Court distinguished the dignity and decorum of attorneys' courtroom communications and communications with the public. 2 6 The state interest is clearly
substantial in courtroom communications. However, where public communications are involved, the state interest cannot justify curtailment of first amendment rights.' 2' Holding the illustration ban unconstitutional, the Court made
two observations. First, illustrations cannot be prohibited because they affect
individuals on a subconscious level."18 Second, the Court indicated decisions
regarding the employment of legal services rarely depend upon criteria that can
be visually represented. Therefore, illustrations in attorneys' ads are less likely
29
to be misrepresentative than in other forms of advertising.'
Finally, the Court addressed the contingency fee issue. Since advertisements
are potentially deceptive when referring to legal fees and legal costs or expenses,
the Court held disclosure requirements relating to contingency fees constitutional
if reasonably related to a state's interest in preventing deception of consumers.""
The state, by requiring a contingent disclosure of truthful and uncontroversial

that weeding out false or misleading attorney advertising is neither impractical nor unduly burdensome. Id. at 2279 n.13. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the FTC proposals
are very similar. See FTC STAFF RPORT, supra note 68, at E-I.
126.
105 S. Ct. at 2280.
127. Id. The Court stated:
[A]lthough the State undoubtedly has a substantial interest in ensuring that its attorneys
behave with dignity and decorum in the courtroom, we are unsure that the State's desire
that attorneys maintain their dignity in their communications with the public is an interest
substantial enough to justify the abridgement of First Amendment rights. Even if that were
the case, we are unpersuaded that undignified behavior would recur so often as to warrant
a prophylactic rule.
Id.
128. Id. at 2280-81. The State asserted:
The use of illustrations in advertising by attorneys ... creates unacceptable risks that the
public will be misled, manipulated, or confused. Abuses associated with the visual content
of advertising are particularly difficult to police, because the advertiser is skilled in subtle
uses of illustrations to play on the emotions of his audience and convey false impressions.
Id. at 2280; cf. Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981)
(promotional content of advertising, such as sounds, sights, color, drawings, etc., operates at the
unconscious level and is therefore potentially false or misleading), vacated, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir.
1982).
129.
105 S. Ct. at 2281.
130. Id. at 2281-82. Dissenting, Justice Brennan pointed out that a state must first demonstrate
the rate-publication requirement directly and proportionately furthers a substantial state interest.
Id. at 2285-86. The Justice also expressed concerns about whether an attorney's simple statement
that he will represent a client on a contingency fee basis can be inherently, or has in practice
been, misleading. He stated:
An attorney's failure to specify a particular percentage rate when advertising that he accepts
cases on a contingent-fee basis can in no way be said to be "inherently likely to deceive"
and the voluminous record in this case fails to reveal a single instance suggesting that
such a failure has in actual ex:perience proven to be deceptive.
Id. at 2287 (citations omitted). In fact, the appellant-attorney argued that disclosures would be
unduly burdensome and tend to chill advertising of contingency fee arrangements. The Court,
however, could not evaluate such a claim because "the Ohio court failed to specify precisely what
disclosures were required."

Id. at 2283 n.15.
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information, eliminates any compulsion to speak.' 3 ' The Court noted that in

certain instances warnings and disclaimers might be appropriate; however, unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements would violate the first
32

amendment. 1
Zauderer emphasizes two recurring themes underlying the Court's commercial
speech cases. First, the first amendment provides a mandate for the free flow
33
of commercial information necessary for an efficient and competitive economy.1
34
The manThe mandate applies to both product and service-oriented markets.
date is of greater importance in service markets where consumers require information on a greater number of unobtainable or unobservable factors. 35 Second,
a presumption exists favoring more rather than less information. 136 Restrictions
inhibiting the flow of truthful information must be the least restrictive possible
and must directly advance a substantial state interest. States may not restrict
certain types of information simply because they may be potentially misleading.
Such a restriction would stifle large classes of truthful information. Instead,
information that can be presented in a non-deceptive manner must not be
prohibited. I

IV.

INFORMATION

ECONOMICS AND THE COMMERCIAL

SPEECH DOCTRINE:

The contemporary commercial speech doctrine reflects the value of information to a consumer-oriented society. 38 A full appreciation of the doctrine
requires inquiry into the economic justifications for limited regulation in information markets. In a complex society, the primary goals of information are
to facilitate decisionmaking and to channel resources into their most productive
uses. 139 Certain information, such as false or misleading advertising, contributes
131. Id. at 2282. Contingent disclosures, sometimes referred to as triggered disclosures, are
disclosures required only if particular claims are made which would be misleading without the
provision of qualifying information. Mazis, Staelin, Beales & Salop supra note 23, at 19.
132. 105 S. Ct. at 2282.
133. See supra notes 36-40, 53-60, 107-09 and accompanying text.
134. Virginia Pharnacy involved prescription drugs, Central Hudson the supply of electricity, and
Bata the provision of legal services.
135. Price is just one of many variables which interest consumers. For example, in legal services
markets, studies have determined factors consumers are most concerned with in selecting an attorney.
One study found the following five factors were most important: (1) extent to which attorney is
able to satisfy all the consumer's needs; (2) friendly and personable qualities; (3) fees charged for
services; (4) specialty or concentration of the attorney; and (5) years of experience. Kasulis &
Humphreys, Legal Services and the Oklahoma Public: A Surov, 50 OKLA. BAR J. 2491, 2498 (1979).
Similarly, another study found availability, reputation, experience, specialty, and fees, in that order,
were most important. Dyer & Shrimp, The Discrepancy Between Consumers' Information Needs and Information Content in Lawyers' Ads, PROC. OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF ADVERTISING (1979).
136. See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 373-75. "Advertising does not provide a complete foundation
on which to select an attorney. But it seems peculiar to deny the consumer, on the ground that
the information is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information needed to reach an informed
decision." Id.
137. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
138. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
139. See H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMic ANALYSIS 231-46 (1978); Coase, Advertising and Free Speech,
6 J. LEGAL SrUD. 1 (1977).
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40
Consequently, this section will
little toward the attainment of these goals.'
present the contributions of information economics to the demarcation between
utile and nonutile information.

A.

Imperfect Information

In a competitive economy, buyers and sellers pursuing their own self-interests
The fundamental prefreely enter into contracts for goods and services.'
sumption of such an economy is that buyers and sellers are perfectly informed
42
However, inforas to important factors which affect their decisionmaking.'
4
mation is a scarce and costly resource.' ' Additional information, although useful
In
in the decisionmaking process, generally increases the transactional costs.'
an
in
time
invest
either
acquiring information the individual must typically
4
independent search'45 or purchase accumulated information from another." b

140. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., J. HENDERSON &: R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMic THEORY (1980). "The consumer
is assumed to choose among the available alternatives in such a manner that the satisfaction derived
from consuming commodities is as large as possible." Id. at 5.
142. The classical economic model of contracting presumes there is perfect information on
both sides of the market. Id. at 136-37. With the assumption of homogeneous products, a single
price will prevail in a perfectly competitive market. Id. However, professional services are often
heterogeneous. Consequently, contracting for professional services may require an alternative method
of analysis. See Goldberg, Toward an Expanded Economic Thoery of Contract, 10 J. EcON. IssuEs 45
(1976) (arguing that economic contract theory lags behind the legal and institutional changes in
society); Macauley, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55
(1963) (seminal article describing bargaining process for relational contracts).
143. See Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. EcON. 213 (1961). "One should hardly
have to tell academicians that information is a valuable resource: knowledge is power." Id. at 213
(emphasis in original).
144. The classical economic model of contracting assumes zero transactions costs See generally
Williamson, Transactions-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 233,
236-38 (1979). There are many types of transaction costs associated with the contracting process.
In addition to search costs, consumers may incur bargaining and enforcement costs. Bargaining
costs entail investments of time and money specifying the terms of the contractual relationship
between buyer and seller. Id. at 238-42. Expert advice from an attorney, accountant or financial
broker is sometimes necessary at this stage. Gibson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE LJ. 2:39, 253-56 (1984). Once the search and bargain are complete,
there remains the possibility of a breach. So, the expected compliance costs of enforcing the agreement become additional transaction costs. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreenents, 53 J. Bus.
27, 27-29 (1980).
145. Because prices and product characteristics frequently change, consumers will not be perfectly informed at any given time. In order to determine the most favorable price/quality combinations currently existing in the market, consumers must devote time and/or money to search
activities. See Stigler, supra note 14-3, at 213-18; see also Carlson & Gieseke, Price Search in a Product
Market, 9 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 357 (1983); Rothschild, Searching for the Lowest Price When the
Distribution of Prices is Unknown, 82 J. POL. EON. 689 (1974); Telser, Searching For the Lowest Price,
63 AMER. EcON. REV. 40 (1973).
Consumers may conduct "search" in a number of ways. Information may be acquired through
direct experience, reputation or advertising. Because products and services are heterogeneous, a
general taxonomy has resulted. One group of commodities are called "experience" goods. Nelson,
Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. EcON. 311, 312 (1970). An experience good is one
whose prominent characteristics are discovered only after purchase and through actual use. A
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Eventually the costs of acquiring additional information outweigh the information's benefits to the decisionmaking process. Consequently, imperfect information results.

147

Because imperfect information characterizes most product and service markets, a number of economic incentives result. First, buyers have an incentive
to become better informed before purchasing goods and services. Increased
information would enable them to identify those goods and services with lower
prices or higher quality.' 4s Next, sellers have an incentive to inform consumers
consumer may repeatedly purchase such a commodity to determine which brand is most preferred.
Id. at 312. Good examples include certain food items and restaurants. A second group is "search"
goods. L at 311. A search good is one whose prominent characteristics can be observed before
purchase. Consumers benefit from pre-purchase searches when preferred characteristics are observable. An example of a search good is clothing. A third type is "credence" goods. Credence goods
are those which cannot be evaluated through direct observation or through use. See Darby & Karni,
Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & EcON. 67, 68-69 (1973). An example
would be physicians' services, because the patient might never know whether the services were necessary. A particular good or service may fit into any or all of the categorizations described above.
Certain goods and services have multiple attributes that could be classified as 'either experience,
search, or credence qualities. Id. at 68-69.
146. Information can be purchased through sources such as consumer periodicals and independent testing agencies. However, information has a number of characteristics which makes its
provision difficult. See Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INvENTvE ACTrvITY 144 (Nat. Bureau Econ. Res. Conf. Report 1962).
First, in the absence of legal protection, an owner cannot appropriate the total value of the information in the open market, because one purchaser could disseminate the information to other
demanders at little cost. As a result, there is a reduced incentive to produce information unless
there are suitable legal protections. Id. at 151. Also, "[tlhere is a fundamental paradox in the
determination of demand for information: the value to the purchaser is not known until he has
the information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost." Id. at 152. Both of these
effects result in less than the efficient level of information production. From a public policy standpoint, promoting the disclosure of information would be beneficial to consumers by increasing the
levels of information production.
147. See, e.g., Stigitz, Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information, 69 AM. ECON.
REv. 339 (1979). Because information is costly, doubt is cast on the classic economic models of
market equilibrium. "Traditional models of competition with perfect information cannot explain
the widely observed phenomena of price distributions ... nor can they explain advertising." Id. at
339.
148. Additionally, the investment in search results in increases in consumers' real income.
Consumers will search until the marginal expected benefits from searching equal the marginal costs
of search. Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 26, at 502; see also Nelson, supra note 145, at 312-

13. Consumers lack information about the prices of goods, but their information is even poorer
regarding quality variations. Id. at 311. Information about quality is more expensive than price
information, so consumers will spend proportionately greater amounts of time searching for indicators of quality. Id. at 312. Also, uncertainty about price is relatively inexpensive to eliminate in
comparison to uncertainty about quality attributes. Shapiro, Consumer Information, Product Quality,
and Seller Reputation, 13 BELL J. ECON. 20 (1982); see also Chan & Leland, Prices and Qualities in
Markets with Costly Information, 49 REv. EcoN. STUD. 499 (1982). Price and qualitative uncertainty
are characteristics of most markets for professional services. The authors demonstrate that multiple
equilibrium price/quality combinations result when sellers select both their selling prices and quality
levels and buyers can acquire price/quality information at a cost. In general, when prices are
observed costlessly but qualities are costly to observe, equilibrium may involve an optimal price
but two levels of quality. Id. at 511. A two-price equilibrium results where firms catering to
uninformed customers choose an optimal quality but charge high prices. Id.
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about their products. Sellers can disclose the type of information consumers
would have difficulty obtaining individually. 4 9 The seller expects that disclosure
of such information will persuade consumers to select the seller rather than the
competition. Finally, the government may intervene to correct informational
50
imbalances caused by imperfect information.'
Advertising restrictions reduce the amount of commercial information consumers demand and generally widen the gap between perfect and imperfect
information. For example, in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court explicitly noted that
consumers benefitted from the absence of advertising restrictions on highly demanded drug price information.' 5' Without distinguishing between consumers
who search for price information and non-searchers, the Court implicitly acknowledged the value of information to both groups. 52 Provided with advertising, consumers do not have to search as diligently for low prices. 53 In actuality,
increased competition due to advertising reduces the average and variance of
market prices.' 54 This empirical reality is important for two reasons. Consumer

149. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24. This informational imbalance is termed
"asymmetric information." Asymmetric information occurs when one individual possesses or has
sole access to information another would deem useful in the bargaining and decision-making process.
See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. EcON.
488, 489-90 (1970); see also Beale,., Craswell & Salop, supra note 26, at 503; Leland, Quacks, Lemons
and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. EcON. 1328, 1329 (1979).
150. See Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal
and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979). Imperfect information does not automatically
signal the need for governmental intervention. Imperfect information may or may not produce
noncompetitive prices and contract terms. Id. at 631. Two kinds of imperfect information may
prevent a customer from making utility-maximizing choices. One is when consumers know of
available options but lack the information to fully evaluate them. Id. at 633 n.8. The second arises
when consumers are ignorant of some elements of an available option. Id. In either case, intervention
is justified only when a market is behaving noncompetitively. Id. at 682. The critical question is
whether governmental remedies such as forced disclosures or fixed contract terms move the market
toward a competitive equilibrium. Id. at 632.
151.
Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64.
152. The consumers' interest in obtaining information on goods and services is particularly
important. Without advertising, consumers individually search for information on the various attributes of each good and service in which they are interested. Such a search could require tremendous amounts of time and effort. See Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729,
729-31 (1974).
153. See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 68. The report noted:
Advertising that announces the presence or the price offer of the advertising firm can serve
as a means of lowering consumer search costs. Such advertising will, in turn, tend to lower
equilibrium ?rices in the market. If advertising is allowed, the individual firm's incentive
for using it is to increase the number of consumers who will be aware of the firm's price
offer. Other things equal, the firm's demand is higher when more consumers are aware
of its presence in the market and its price offer.
Id. at 81.
154. Substantial benefits of advertising are the reduction in the mean and variance of market
prices. The advertising of price information places competitive pressures on all sellers. Competing
sellers will have to match the advertiser's price or risk losing customers. Consequently, prices tend
to fall and cluster closer together absent advertising restrictions.
The inequity to consumers resulting from advertising bans was clearly noted in Virginia Pharmacy.
The parties' stipulation of facts indicated that price differentials up to 1200% for the same amounts
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search time decreases as the disparity between prices of competing sellers di55
minishes and, on an average, non-searching consumers win pay lower prices.'
B.

Information on Quality

Price information is most important when goods or services can be standardized. Consumers can compare prices more readily on standardized products
than on nonstandardized products. 56 When products or services cannot be standardized, however, consumers demand more than price information. They also
seek information about other attributes of a seller's product or service.' 5 7 For
example, without access to information on a particular attorney's quality attributes, consumers incur the risk of selecting a low quality attorney.' 58 If consumers cannot distinguish between a high and low quality attorney, then one
price may represent an average quality level rather than multiple price-quality
combinations.' 5 9 Consequently, a high quality attorney who cannot inform consumers regarding his quality has a reduced incentive to provide more than
average quality.160 On the other hand, low quality attorneys benefit from hiding
6
the quality of their services.' '

Consumers demand information providing various measures of the product's
or service's quality which may be immeasurable or unobservable either before
or after purchase.' 62 For example, in determining whether to employ an attorof identical drugs existed in Chicago. 425 U.S. at 754 n.11. Studies from two other cities, New
York and Washington, D.C., made similar findings. Empirically, numerous studies have shown
the reduction in both the average and variability of offer prices in many different product and
service markets. See, e.g., A. MAURIZI & T. KELLY, PRICES AND CONSUMER INFORMATION: THE
BENEFITS FROM POsTING RETAIL GASOLINE PRICEs (1978) (retail gasoline); FTC STAFF REPORT, supra
note 68 (legal services); Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & EcoN.
337 (1972) (prescription eyeglasses); Cady, An Estimate of thePrice Effects of Restrictions on Drug Price
Advertising, 14 EcoN. INQUIRY 493 (1976) (non-prescription drugs); Feldman & Begun, Dois Advertising
of Prices Reduce the Mean and Variance of Pices?, 18 ECON. INQUIRY 487 (1980) (eye examinations);
Glazer, Advertising, Information and Prices - A Case Study, 19 EcON. INQUIRY 661 (1981) (food prices
in supermarkets); Maurizi, The Effects of Laws Against Retail Price Advertising: The Case of Retail Gasoline,
10 W. EcON. J. 321 (1972) (retail gasoline).
155. Additionally, there is a reduction in the market power of sellers vis-a-vis buyers. See FTC
STAFF REPORT, supra note 68, at 81. "In markets where consumers are poorly informed about the
distribution of price offers and where search is costly, sellers tend to have some degree of monopoly
power." Id.
156. See Nelson, supra note 145, at 311-12.
157. See generally Darden, Darden & Kiser, The Marketing of Legal Services, 45 J. MARKETING

123 (1981).
158. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosures About Product Quality,
24 J.L. & EcON. 461, 463 (1981).
159. See generally Akerlof, supra note 149, at 488-90, (automobile markets); Leland, supra note
149, at 1329 (since consumers cannot distinguish between sellers, they are only willing to pay one
price representing average quality).
160. See Darden, Darden & Kiser, supra note 157, at 123 (1981).
161. See Grossman, supra note 158, at 461. With a one-price equilibrium, consumers expect
average quality. There would be no incentive to provide a higher quality level without the expectation of increasing future profits. Id.
162. Id at 462. The author considers the case where statements about product quality are too
costly either to communicate or verify ex post. Id. So, the statements cannot be guaranteed. He
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ney, consumers must currently rely upon the attorney's reputation as a measure
of pre-purchase quality. Information concerning an attorney's reputation is usually transmitted through word-of-mouth, a generally costly and inefficient medium of communication. '6 3 Advertising quality claims provide a more cost-efficient
medium. However, advertisements presenting quality information may be less
credible than those containing reputational information. Nevertheless, safeguards
such as laws prohibiting false, misleading or deceptive advertisements combined
with the existence of a market providing reputational information may effectively
check advertisers' claims. 164
Quality information can be conveyed in a manner similar to price information. Sellers would disclose the most appealing and persuasive attributes to
buyers. Buyers could force sellers into such disclosures by focusing their purchasing decisions on individual attributes. In this way, competition on quality
attributes results. 6 5 However, price advertising alone is insufficient to create
such competition. For there to be multiple combinations of price and quality
available in the market, advertising of both price and quality is necessary. The
presence of these multiple combinations is especially significant in professional
service markets, since there are minimum standards of performance.' 66 For instance, many consumers of legal services may desire only the minimal quality
of representation because their needs may involve little risk to life, liberty or
property which might occur if the attorney's service fails to resolve the matter
in question. 6 7 These clients may be willing to forego premium service for minimal representation. Given similar needs, other clients may be willing to pay
more for individualized services. Nevertheless, both types of clients benefit from
quality advertisements. The low-price attorney essentially signals that his low-

does assume there is some characteristic that is observable ex post which relates to product quality.

Id. Post-purchase, and even while employing an attorney, consumers have difficulty monitoring
their attorney's activities. The attorney-client relationship is based upon the superior knowledge of
the attorney, so the client will have difficulties in assessing both the diligence and skills of the
attorney. See Arrow, The Economics of Agency, TECH.
STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL

SCIENCES,

STANFORD

UNIV.

REPORT

No. 451,

INSTITUTE FOR MATHEMATICAL

(Oct. 1984).

163. See Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 67, at 1096 (1983). See also Nelson, supra note
145, at 311-12. Since information about quality is generally more expensive to obtain than price
information, quality searchers may behave in a fundamentally different manner than price searchers.
Though information about quality can be acquired in a fashion similar to price information, at
some point the costs of search become prohibitively high and other sources of information are
substituted. Id. Consequently, consumers searching for professional services resort to reputational
information and even random selection in the absence of readily obtainable sources of quality
information. See B. CURRAN, supra note 14, at 200-03. In a survey of first time users of legal
services, 62% of consumers selected attorneys relying upon reputational information from friends,
relatives, or other business or non-business acquaintances. The remaining 38% was widely distributed between various sources including yellow pages (2%) and other miscellaneous methods
(11%). Id. at 203. Of course, the survey was completed in 1977 when attorney advertising was
in its infancy.
164. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel supra note 67, at 1097-1100.
165. See Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 26, at 502.
166. In addition to licensing requirements, which presumably ensure a minimal level of quality,
clients are protected to a certain degree by a potential tort action should the attorney be negligent.
167. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 67, at 1090.
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cost, minimum-standard services are for the former class of consumers.168 Higherpriced, higher-quality attorneys provide individualized service to the latter class
of consumers by advertising greater personal attention or alternative fee ar6
rangements. 9

Consumers demanding greater individualized attention will naturally seek
additional information beyond that provided directly by the sellers. 7M To verify
quality claims, a consumer can consult others who have utilized similar services.
Information on others' personal experiences with similar problems or particular
attorneys is of greater significance to the quality-seeking consumer. 7 ' Advertising
tends to cause consumers to seek information about the attorney's reputation.
If the attorney's reputation is inconsistent with his advertising claims, consumers
will tend to distrust him. As a result, the attorney may spend a great deal of
money on an ad campaign that fails, and indirectly informs potential clients
of his unfavorable reputation. The consequences of a discrepancy between reputational and advertisement information provide a tremendous incentive to sup72
ply truthful information.
Additionally, quality advertising furthers the goal of providing consumers
with more information. First, the seller's primary motivation for advertising is
to attract customers. 173 Sellers have little incentive to inform the public without
an expectation of increased sales. Their incentive to provide important consumer
information is suppressed by a prohibition on self-laudatory or quality claims.
The fear of sanctions effectively reduces the amount of information sellers will
be willing to disseminate. Consequently, advertisers who cannot include persuasive, though truthful, elements in74 their advertisements have a reduced incentive to provide any information.'

168. See Smith & Cox, supra note 65, at 169-71 (1985).
169. Id. at 182-83. Low-price, minimum quality sellers may try to advertise their services as
being of the same quality as higher priced sellers. However, consumers who believe quality does
not differ among sellers will naturally gravitate towards the low price seller. Consumers demanding
a higher quality level will necessarily either accept the advertiser's claim or seek additional information. See infra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
170. For example, in legal services markets, consumers are concerned with a number of variables other than price, such as specialized training, reputation, quality of training, experience, etc.
Darden, Darden & Kiser, supra note 157, at 131.
171. Reputational information from a friend or acquaintance is very influential. This type of
information is considered trustworthy. Consumers will continue searching in order to compare and
evaluate information from different sources. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 67, at 109596.
172. Id. at 1099-1100.
173. Many courts find this fact difficult to accept. See, e.g., Eaton v. Supreme Court, 270
Ark 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981). "[The ad's] primary purpose
was not to inform the consumer ... but rather to urge a group of specific potential consumers to
seek petitioners' services." Id. at 580, 607 S.W. 2d at 59. The court opined the ad was merely
designed to lure customers into the advertiser's place of business. Id. at 581, 607 S.W.2d at 60.
The court's concern was the fact that the attorney's ad contained a first consultation fee of $10
without listing fees for specific services. Apparently, the court felt that the phrase "Other Legal
Problems?" was both a lure to unwary consumers and an assertion of competency in any legal
area. Id. at 580, 607 S.W.2d at 59.
174. See supra note 26.
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Second, quality information is important to consumers. Consumers want to
know what services and attention to expect from a seller. Especially with interpersonal services, information identifying the advertiser as an individual with
whom the consumer can eflectively communicate becomes important. 7 ' The
free flow of this type of information is enhanced by unrestricted truthful advertising. Within this class of truthful information are quality and self-laudatory
claims. These claims can be truthful and presented in a non-misleading manner.
C.

Regulating Consumer Information

A justification for intervention in information markets to correct or protect
the flow of commercial information is the broad notion that informed consumers
are necessary to the efficient functioning of a free market economy.' 7 However,
recent debate focused on the proper remedial measures to ensure the optimal
flow of information. " ' Historically, caveat emptor prevailed in the market place.
As a result of the consumer protection movement, legislative enactments were
passed to regulate potential suppliers of information."' In recent years, the
effectiveness and efficiency of these regulations raised considerable debate. Methodologies analyzing the costs and benefits of information restraints have emerged,
enabling public policy decisionmakers to examine alternative remedies. " 9
Three alternative remedies are available to correct problems in information
markets: (1) removing existing restraints on information flows; (2) enhancing
information flows; and (3) restricting information flows. 8 " Conventional wisdom
suggests that removing information restraints facilitates competition for both
price and product attributes. Consequently, the first remedy has been implemented in many product and professional service markets. Use of the second
remedy has also increased. Most regulations inherently suggest increases in the
flow of information alleviate the effects of potentially misleading or deceptive
information. Finally, the restriction of harmful information underlies laws prohibiting false, misleading or deceptive communications. Enforcement mechanisms for the third remedy began developing about the time of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) Act.' " '
With the presumption favoring unrestricted information markets, a balance
between highly restrictive infbrmation restraints and the total removal of all

175. Consumers identify the personality of their prosepective attorney as being an important
factor. L. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 46 (friendliness and personable qualities ranked second in
Oklahoma survey).
176. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 26, at 491; Grossman, supra note 158, at
461; Mazis, Staelin, Beales, & Salop, supra note 23, at 11; Pridgen & Preston, Enhancing the Flow
of Information in the Marketplace: From Caveat Emptor to Virginia Pharmacy and Beyond at the Federal Trade
Commission, 14 GA. L. REv. 635 (1980); Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 150, at 632-39.
178. See Schwartz & Wilde, supya note 150, at 630 n.1.
179. Id.; see also Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 26; Mazis, Staclin, Beales & Salop,
supra note 23.
180. Beales, Craswell & Salop, supra note 26, at 491; Mazis, Staelin, Beales & Salop, supra
note 23, at 11.
181.
Pridgen & Preston, supra note 177, at 641-42.
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restrictions has developed, Consequently, the intermediate remedy, enhancing
the flow of information, becomes the focal point. This remedy provides numerous alternatives for increasing consumer benefits without substantially altering information markets. First, standard-setting facilitates comparison shopping
by consumers' 8 2 A regulator can establish a grading system by requiring sellers
to meet certain standards before utilizing a particular definition in their ads.
In the service markets, for instance, a professional certification may be required
before claims of specialization are allowed. -Classes of specialization could also
be created which rank certification levels by years in practice or number of
clients served. However, the drawbacks to such a system are numerous. 8 3 The
problem of determining the proper standard becomes a difficult one.
Second, regulations can increase consumer search opportunities. When the
attributes of a product or service are difficult to judge purchaser 'cooling-off'
laws provide consumers the opportunity to cancel purchase agreements after
direct inspection or experience with the product or service) 84 These experience
remedies provide significant consumer protection but are potentially costly to
sellers whose contracts are cancelled.
Third, mandatory disclosure requirements provide for across-the-board or
triggered divulgence of information 8 5 A triggered disclosure is required when
a particular representation would be misleading without inclusion of qualifying
information. Such a disclosure requirement provides consumers with additional
information to facilitate informed decisions. Similarly, across-the-board disclosures apply to broad classes of information that all sellers would be unlikely to
provide. 8 6 In both cases, disclosure requirements increase the costs of providing
information.' 87 Because the information advertiser has less time or space to insert
another message, public policymakers must weigh disclosure costs against any
asserted benefits.' 88
Information remedies are designed to increase consumer benefits by prohibiting the dissemination of false, misleading or deceptive advertisements. Ab182.

Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 26, at 523-27.

183. Id.
184. Mazis, Staelin, Beaes, & Salop, supra note 23, at 16-17.
185. Id at 18-19; see also Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 26, at 527-31.

186. Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 26, at 527.
187. Id. at 528. "Triggered disclosures may also have the perverse property of burdening the
sellers whose products score the best as they are the ones most likely to make the triggering claims.
As such, triggered disclosures may place these firms at a competitive disadvantage rather than the
competitive advantage they deserve." Id. Also, "[t]he required disclosure necessarily displaces ,other

information which the advertiser would rather convey." Id. "Even if the disclosure displaces only
empty space, as in a print advertisement, that empty space was there to facilitate effective com-

munication of the advertiser's message. Advertisers do not typically pay for blank space unless they
think it serves a useful purpose." Id. at 528 n.101. Also, the impact of disclosure requirements
can be enormous depending upon the type of medium. For example, the average cost of a primetime network television ad in 1980 was about $3,000 per second. Id. at 529. Consequently, disclosure
requirements can cause advertisers to incur significant costs.
188. Id. at 529-53. Information disclosures also have social welfare implications. Information
disclosure requirements generally provide greater benefits and protections to the middle class. Day,
Assessing the .Effects of Information Disclosure Requirements, 40 J. MARKETING 42, 49 (1975).
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sent state bar regulation in the professional services markets, state, federal,
common law and statutory protections exist for misled clients. First, federal
statutory enactments, such as the FTC Act, prohibit unfair and deceptive acts
which affect commerce. 1' 9 The Zauderer Court cited the FTC's standards and
methods as providing particularly important guidance for state bars in their
analysis of attorney advertising."" State statutes and common law provide consumer protection remedies to prevent false or misleading advertising and misrepresentation. 9 ' Additionally, the increasing use of tort law furnishes a remedy
for misled clients. Attorneys holding themselves out as experts or making claims
92
of quality or superiority are held to such standards in malpractice suits.'
Therefore, state bar regulations provide supplemental consumer protection by
sanctioning attorneys who fail to comply with ethical practices.
D.

Market Self-Regulation of Information

In addition to enforcement mechanisms restraining false, misleading or deceptive advertisements, numerous economic incentives safeguard the marketplace
from misleading information. For instance, the motivations underlying the provision of false, misleading or deceptive information are limited to particular
situations. First, sellers who do not rely on repeat sales have an incentive to
increase current sales through misleading information.' 93 Because there is no
expectation for future sales, sellers are concerned only with maximizing shortterm profits. Misled consumers have no effective opportunity to sanction these
sellers. Second, sellers unconcerned with maintaining a particular reputation can
successfully use misleading advertisements without fear of retribution. '" Sellers
may increase profits through deceptive ads because consumers are minimally
aware of the seller. Of course, most businesses are concerned with protecting
their reputation, tradename, trademark or other measure of goodwill. An effective market mechanism restraining false advertising claims is the potentially
adverse effect an erroneous or untruthful claim may have on the advertiser's
reputation.' 95 Finally, if the magnitude of loss is small, the consumer is less
likely to pursue sanctions against the seller. 96 But, as the consumer's loss due
to the deception increases, the possibility of litigation is greatly enhanced.
The market also contains a certain amount of self-regulation among providers
of professional services. For example, an attorney's own reputation is an extremely important asset. An attorney who makes ludicrous or misrepresentative
claims is subject to disassociation and censure by other attorneys and potential

189.
190.
191.
Client, 31
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
See Devine, Letting the Market Control Advertising by Lawyers: A Suggested Remedy for the Misled
BUFFALO L. REV. 351 (1982).
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 161-62 (4th ed. 1971).
Jordan & Rubin, supra note 58, at 530.
See id.
Hazard, Pearce, & Stempel, supra note 67, at 1097-1100.
Jordan & Rubin, supra note 58, at 530.
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clients. 197 The "grapevine" effectively disseminates information between attorneys and potential clients and between attorneys themselves. An attorney's incentive to make misleading claims regarding his qualifications or services is
effectively tempered by the potential for ostracism.
V.

QUALITY AND SELF-LAUDATION:

DEFINITIONS AND JUDICIAL TREATMENT
98

The definition of claims of quality'
or self-laudation 9 9 is necessarily broad.
Claims regarding quality are inextricably intertwined with self-laudatory speech
since most claims of quality are also self-laudatory. In fact, claims which include
numerous factors could be interpreted as claims of quality or self-commendation.
For example, a statement that one has a degree from a prestigious school,
although truthful, is an implicit quality claim and self-commendation. 2 °° Statements that one is competent and trustworthy, even if verified by admittance
to the bar, are prohibited quality claims.2 0 ' States also totally prohibit words
such as "expert," "experienced" or "highly qualified" as subjective evaluations
of a lawyer's credentials or the quality of services. 20 Some states even regard
2 03
price advertising as an implicit quality claim.

197. For example, "[advertisements] inform the listener of the value of professional legal assistance in certain situations ... If some members of the audience find them distasteful, such
consumers might very well react by shunning the service offered, thereby imposing an informal
sanction more effective than any formal regulation." Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 192 Conn.
15, 27, 470 A.2d 228, 234 (1984).
198. Quality is defined as a "peculiar and essential characteristic," an "inherent feature," a
"degree of excellence" or a "distinguishing attribute." WEsBrER's DICTIONARY 699 (7th ed. 1972).
199. Self-laudation is the act of praising oneself. Praise is to express a favorable judgment or
to commend. Id. at 667.
200. See Andrews, Lawyer Advertising and the FirstAmendment, 1981 A.B.FoUND RESEARCH J. 967,
1005 (1981). The rule against quality claims seems to prohibit a lawyer from communicating that
he graduated first in his class at Harvard Law School.
201. Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (attorney's right to assert at least restrained claims of quality using words like "competent" and
"trustworthy" not constitutionally protected), vacated, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982).
202. Some courts have barred the use of certain words or expressions as being inherently
misleading or deceptive. See Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa
1981) (subjective characterizations of fees as "cut-rate," "give-away," "low-cost," or "special"
not protected by first amendment because such adjectives have high potential to mislead), vacated,
686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982); Spencer v. Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984)
(state's prohibition on the use of words such as "experienced" that subjectively characterize attorney's background directly advances state's substantial interest in protecting consumers from misleading claims). Some state bars define certain terms such as "legal clinics" or "routine legal
services." If an attorney uses such a term in an advertisement, the term must comport with the
state's definition. See, e.g., Bishop, 521 F. Supp. at 1234-35 (Iowa disciplinary rules defining the
phrases "specific legal services" and "clinics"); Spencer, 579 F. Supp. at 887-88 (attorney's characterization of his background as an "experienced" pilot and computer programmer is inherently
misleading and should be totally banned). Contra In re Marcus, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 579, 320 N.W.2d
806, 816 (1982) (attorney ad which stated that firm possessed a "high level of legal expertise"
was not false, misleading or deceptive).
203. Lyon v. Alabama State Bar, 451 So. 2d 1367, 1373 (Ala. 1984) ("Implicit in our holding
... is that any type of price advertising by attorneys involves inherent questions of quality."); see
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Many state bar associations prohibit quality or self-laudatory claims despite
the broad reach of such terms.2 4 However, few define what constitutes such
claims. 20 5 Generally, quality claims fit into two broad categories (a) statements
regarding the attorney's services, and (b) statements regarding the attorney's
qualifications. Self-laudatory claims may be included in a third category for
claims that generally commend the attorney. The first category contains stateBates, 433 U.S. at 400 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]he court notes
that it has not addressed 'the peculiar problems associated with advertising claims relating to the
quality of legal services.' There are inherent questions of quality in almost any type of price advertisings by lawyers and I do not view appellants' advertisement as entirely free from quality
implications"); see also Smith & Cox, supra note 65. The authors provide an analysis of the market
process that generates variations across firms in the contractual arrangements for pricing routine
legal services. They conclude that firms quoting hourly rates for a service not only charge effectively
higher prices but also anticipate more hours to complete the service. Id. at 182. They further
conclude:
Brand name is a determinant of the price premium associated with services of firms using
hourly rate pricing and that the premium is justified, at least in part, by the expectation
of more hours to complete and to guarantee the service. This expectation, in turn, is a
result of the firm's value-maximizing decision to invest in quality-distinguishing signals.
The signal attracts clients with more complex jobs, relatively greater demand for a qualityguaranteed service, and greater potential for opportunism in the absence of ex post determined prices.
Id. Essentially, the authors demonstrate that the method of pricing of legal services acts as a signal
of the quality the law firm provides (as measured by hours to complete a given routine service).
204. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-101 (Proposal "B") (adopted by
27 states, the Code's provision contains broad prohibitions on quality and self-laudatory claims).
EC 2-101(C) provides that:
A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner or associate, or any other lawyer
affiliated with him or his firm, use or participate in the use of any form of public communication which:
(1) Is intended or is likely to result in a legal action or a legal position being asserted
merely to harass or maliciously injure another;
(2) Contains statistical data or other information based on past performance or prediction of future success;
(3) Contains a testimonial about or endorsement of a lawyer;
(4) Contains a statement of opinion as to the quality of the services or contains a
representation or implication regarding the quality of legal services which is not susceptible
of reasonable verification by the public;
(5) Appeals primarily to a layperson's fear, greed, desire for revenge, or similar emotion; or
(6) Is intended or is likely to attract clients by use of showmanship, puffery, selflaudation or hucksterism, including the use of slogans, jingles or garish or sensational
language or format; or
(7) Utilizes television until [the agency having jurisdiction under state law] shall have
determined that the use of such media is necessary in light of the existing provisions of
the Code, accords with standards of accuracy, reliability and truthfulness, and would facilitate the process of informed selection of lawyers by potential consumers of legal services.
Id.
205. Cf. NEw MEXICO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1978). A selflaudatory claim is described as including a statement that (I) contains a prediction of the result
of any future legal proceeding; (2) contains statistical data based upon past performance; (3) contains
a testimonial about a lawyer; (4) contains a statement as to the quality of services provided; or
(5) makes a comparative statement regarding another lawyer. Id.
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ments which guarantee the outcome for particular services rendered. For example, asserting that a client can expect unjustified results that are beyond the
control of the attorney is clearly a misleading statement. 211 Many states require
all advertisements to contain disclaimers stating that no representation is made
about the quality of services to be performed. 2 7 However, certain claims relating
to the quality of an attorney's work are not misleading. For example, an attorney's self imposed five-day limit for prompt-service-delivery-or-free-perform28
ance, an implicit guarantee of quality, is within the attorney's control. 1
Unsolicited advice regarding the legal rights of potential clients and the advertiser's current handling of such lawsuits cannot be prohibited despite the
20 9
advertiser's willingness to represent readers with similar suits.
States may also prohibit the use of a tradename or trademark 210 since they
have been interpreted as implicitly misleading quality claims. 21' A tradename
206. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.1 (1983). "A communication is false
or misleading if it: ... (b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer
can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means that violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law ....
Id.
207. See, e.g., ALABAMA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 2-102(A)(7)(); see also Lyon
v. Alabama State Bar, 451 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1984) (rule requiring disclaimer does not unconstitutionally infringe upon attorneys' first amendment rights); Mezrano v. Alabama State Bar, 434
So. 2d 732 (Ala, 1983) (disclaimer does not infringe on free speech since state has no attorney
rating system).
208. See State ex. rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Schaffer, 648 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1982). An attorney
published an ad stating that within five working days from clients' provision of necessary information he would file all necessary court documents, or if filing were note appropriate, begin
providing legal services. If he failed to meet the five day limit, he would provide the services for
free. The court stated:
A lawyer's product guarantee might be deemed potentially or presumably deceptive if it
is in the nature of a promise whose fulfillment is clearly beyond the sole control of the
promisor. This is not the case here. Respondent's representations cannot be considered
excessive because his pledge of prompt-service-delivery-or-free-performance is quite well
within his own human means to accomplish.
Id. at 359. The court further noted that even if the attorney's promise were a guarantee of
performance of quality work, the state surely has no demonstrable interest in discouraging expeditious lawyer performance. Id.
209. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280. The Court addressed the issue of whether a state bar could
prohibit unsolicited advice through a print advertisement. The ad in question informed readers
that the Dalkon Shield had spawned a large number of lawsuits and advised them that the advertiser
was currently handling such cases. Id. at 2271-72. The ad made no representations about the
likelihood of a successful suit. Id. Interestingly, the Court noted other plaintiffs had been successful
in winning favorable settlements and jury verdicts; in fact, A.H. Robins, the principal defendant,
had settled or satisfied judgments in 6,289 cases and over 3,600 cases were still pending. Id. at
2276 n.10. Whether inclusion of such statistical data in the appellant-attorney's advertisement could
be constitutionally prohibited remains a significant question. See supra note 179 (prohibitions on the
use of statistical data as indicators of past performance or future success).
210. As used here, the term trademark is synonymous with the proper term service mark.
211. The prohibition on trademark or tradename use is based upon a belief that such names
or marks do not provide consumers with any useful information. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1 (1979). The Friedman Court upheld a Texas prohibition on the use of tradenames in
connection with optometric services. In so doing, the Court stated that trademarks are commercial
speech without any intrinsic meaning. Id. at 12. Because there is a significant possibility that trade
names will be used in a misleading or deceptive manner, the Court held their use can be prohibited.
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or trademark identifies a particular product or service, and after some time,
consumers identify the name or mark with a particular price and quality of
service. Consequently, trademarks and tradenames also convey information about
2 2
the price and quality of a seller's services. 1 Nonetheless, many states prohibit
21
1
use.
their
The second category contains statements which include representations about
an attorney's personal qualifications. These statements are represented from
either an attorney's perspective (i.e. self-laudation) or a third party's perspective
(i.e. testimonials, Martindale-Hubbell ratings, former clients, etc.). Quality or
self-laudatory statements invite controversy regarding the use of modifiers and
adjectives that differentiate degrees of qualifications. 2 4 For example, an ad which
states "Attorney: Five Years Trial Experience" is distinguishable from another
stating "Experienced Attorney. ' 21 5 The former representation conveys more
Id. at 13-15. However, the dissent pointed out that if trade names have no intrinsic meaning, they
cannot by themselves be deceptive. "A trade name will deceive only if it is used in a misleading
context." Id. at 24. Instead, trade names serve a very valuable purpose: they permit consumers
in a mobile society to more quickly and cheaply locate providers they prefer. Id. at 22-23. Also,
the prohibition on trade names entirely precludes the low-cost, high-volume mode of organizing
optometrical practices and selling highly standardized products. Id. at 23. In their holding, the
majority also stressed the factual findings that some optometric firms had used trade names to
deceive consumers. Id. at 13-15. However, most firms have a tremendous incentive to protect their
investments in goodwill and reputation which can both be represented by trade names. See supra
notes 193-97 and accompanying text. See also Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp.
1219, 1226 (S.D. Iowa 1981) ("Signs and symbols, such as logos, do not set forth facts or otherwise
inform. They are promotional in nature, and they can be misleading."), vacated, 686 F.2d 1278
(8th Cir. 1982).; cf. In Re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 176, 470 N.E.2d 838, 845, 481 N.Y.S.
40, 48 (1984) ("The purpose of the prohibition against trade names . . . is to prevent the public
from being deceived about the identity, responsibility and status of those who use the name..."),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985). Trademarks and tradenames will become increasingly important
as the market for legal services becomes less regional and more national. Law firms that operate
in a number of geographic locations, either intrastate or interstate, would benefit from the use of
a trademark or tradename since mobile consumers would be able to readily identify their services.
The tradename or trademark of a highly reputable firm could become associated with quality legal
services. The trademark or tradenrame would convey important information to consumers in such
a case especially to highly mobile consumers who are not familiar with local law firms. See F.
SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 378-79 (2d ed. 1980).
212. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 (1979). "Once a trade name has been use
for some time, it may serve to ...
convey information about the type, price, and quality of services
offered for sale...."
Id.
213. In 1980, only nine states affirmatively allowed the use of tradenames. See L. ANDREWS,
supra note 12, at 135-46. However, both the Model Rules and the FTC proposed rules permit the
use of trade names as long as they are not deceptive or misleading. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.5 (1983), FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 68, at 151.
214. Compare In re Marcus, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 320 N.W.2d 806 (1982) (use of phrases "high
level of legal expertise," "high level of professionalism," and "competent lawyers" not false,
misleading or deceptive) with Spencer v. Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (use
of terms such as "experienced," "highly qualified," or "competent" are subjective evaluations of
lawyer's credentials and can be prohibited).

215. See Spencer v. Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984). An attorney with a
master's degree in computer science and a certified pilots license desired to mail advertising directly
to targeted groups. Id. at 882. He sought a declaratory judgment regarding the use of the phrase

"experienced pilot" or "experienced computer programmer." Id. at 887. The bar argued that any
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information while the latter is somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless, many state
bars prohibit both types of ads. Some states label the ads self-laudatory, 2 6 others
consider the representation misleading. 2 7 In either case, most state bars fear
the latter type of ad will mislead or deceive potential clients.
Similarly, puffery, a subset of self-laudation, is generally prohibited based
upon the notion that obviously self-inflated claims contribute little to the market
of commercial information. Puffery is advertising or other sales representations
that praise a product or service through subjective opinions, superlatives, or
exaggerations, which are factually vague and general. 218 Depending upon the
particular statement, puffery may or may not be innocuous. Puffery that misstates material facts is not protected speech. 219 However, whether puffing would
result by eliminating prohibitions on quality and self-laudatory statements is
doubtful. First, attorneys generally lack the incentive to engage in the dissemination of meaningless superlatives. 220 Consumers can recognize such claims and
would discount unsubstantiated claims that provide little information. 22' In fact,
subjective characterization of the attorney's background is inherently misleading and should be
totally banned. Id. The court agreed stating:
Rather than identify himself as an "experienced" pilot, plaintiff can convey his experience through the use of more objective information such as the number of hours flown
in various types of aircraft, his certification by the Federal Aviation Administration as a
pilot in single engine planes, and his certification as a flight instructor in single and multiengine aircraft. Similarly, a lawyer may describe the quality of his legal services only
through the use of objective, verifiable terms such as the number of cases handled in a
particular legal field or the number of years in practice.
Id. at 887-88.
216. See supra notes 204-05.
217. See, e.g., Mezrano v. Alabama State Bar, 434 So. 2d 732 (Ala. 1983). "The Alabama
Bar does not identify attorneys as specialists. Therefore, we feel that attorneys' representations
about the quality of their legal services could very well mislead the public." Id. at 735. See also
Zimmerman v. Office of Grievance Comm., 79 A.D.2d 263, 438 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1981) (lawyer
who advertised practice in 25 areas but who admitted no experience in several violates the false,
misleading or deceptive standard).
218. I. PRESTON, THE GREAT AMERICAN BLow-Up 17 (1975); see also W. PROSSER, supra note
192, at 722-23 ("[P]uffing ... is considered to be offered and understood as an expression of the
seller's opinion only, which is to be discounted as such by the buyer, and on which no reasonable
man would rely ... "); Better Living, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 648, 653 (1957) ("[E]xaggerations reasonably
to be expected of a seller as to the degree of quality of his product, the truth or falsity of which
cannot be precisely determined"), aff'd, 259 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1958). This tipe of claim would
be precluded under most state bar codes as an "exaggeration" which could not be substantiated
or is not susceptible of reasonable verification by the public. &e, e.g., FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B)(7), DR 2-101(C)(4) (1983).
219. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1945) ("While a seller has
some latitude in 'puffing' his goods, he is not authorized to misrepresent them or to assign to
them benefits or virtues they do not possess.").
220. Attorneys who advertise in such a manner incur substantial risks that their ads will offend
or cause distrust in potential clients. See Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 67, at 1097-1 100.
221. See Andrews, supra note 200, at 1005:
Although it could be argued that a prohibition against quality claims is necessary to protect
the public from "puffing," it may well be that consumers are already so used to discounting
the "puffing" in communications about products that they will likewise be able to give
self-laudatory comments in lawyers' communications their proper weight.
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the FTC assumes that exaggerated opinion claims are incapable of deception. 22
Consumers searching for the "best" attorney would be inclined to rely upon
more credible information, such as personal experience or reputation. 223 Consumers interested in pursuing particular claims would seek information more
pertinent to their situations.
Attorneys would also incur a substantial risk of alienating potential clients
through blatant hucksterism. 22 4 Some potential clients are attracted to an attorney claiming superiority over the competition. If these clients would not
otherwise have asserted their claims, the advertising is socially beneficial. 22 1 On
the other hand, many potential clients would likely avoid associating with an
attorney whose advertisements exude self-serving laudation. However, prohibiting quality or self-recommendation statements merely because some consumers
disdain the manner or form of such claims only serves to deny informative
226
advertising to other potential clients.
A.

State Bar Codes

Generally, state bar codes limit the type of information that attorneys can
include in their ads. Many states list the precise information an attorney may
use in an advertisement. 22 7 However, such lists cannot be totally exclusive.
Potentially misleading information is not prohibited if presented in a non-deceptive manner. 221 Consequently, many states have a two-step process for determining whether certain information may be included in attorney
advertisements. First, the information must be "informative. 2 2 9 Second, the
222. Pridgen & Preston, supra note 177, at 644. The FTC relies upon the "ancient doctrine"
which makes distinctions between opinion and fact. Rather than outright prohibitions, the FTC
has examined puffery claims on a case-by-case basis. Id. Citing recent studies that indicate puffery
may have a significant potential to deceive, the authors suggest that research be undertaken to
determine the number of consumers that might be deceived by particular claims. Id.
223. Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 67, at 1095-96.
224. Id. at 1097-1100.
225. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2278. In holding the State's asserted justification that advertising
will stir up litigation without merit, the Court stated:
There is no cause for consternation when a person who believes in good faith and on the
basis of accurate information regarding his legal rights that he has suffered a legally cognizable injury turns to the courts for a remedy[.]... That our citizens have access to their
civil courts is not an evil to be regretted; rather, it is an attribute of our system of justice
in which we ought to take pride.
Id.
226. "[T]he mere possibility that some members of the population might find advertising
embarrassing or offensive cannot justify suppressing it." Id. at 2280 (citing Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)).
227. These types of codes are termed regulatory codes, twenty-nine states have regulatory
codes based upon ABA-recommended Proposal "A". L. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 135-46.
228. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. "States may not place an absolute prohibition on certain types
of potentially misleading information ... if the information ... may be presented in a way that is
not deceptive." ld.
229. Courts make distinctions between "factual" information and promotional information.
See, e.g., Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1224-25 (S.D. Iowa 1981)
(factual information protected, promotional is potentially misleading), vacated, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th
Cir. 1982).
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information must be presented according to particular standards. 230 Most state
bars limit attorney advertisements by either a regulatory approach that prohibits
all types of contents except those specifically listed, 23' or a directive approach
that presumptively makes certain types of information false, misleading or deceptive. 232 In either instance, their goal is to allow only factual and informative
representations.
Most state bar rules prohibit "persuasive" information by -restraining the
manner and form of advertisements. Rules that prohibit appeals to the emotions,
prejudice, likes or dislikes of consumers are examples. 233 Banning the use of
showmanship, puffery, hucksterism, slogans, jingles or garish or sensational
language also limits the presentation of information. 234 Use of color, special
235
lighting or other methods of sensory stimulation is prohibited in some states.
Finally, many states require "dignified" ads. 236 Such restrictions ensure attorneys present only factual information in a standardized form. Consequently,
attorneys cannot differentiate their ads from other attorney advertisements nor
237
from all other ads competing for consumers' attention.
Whether the manner in which attorneys communicate information in an ad
conforms to state standards creates a secondary problem. Rather than viewing
ads from a consumer perspective, many judges or state bar commissions appraise
230. Id. at 1224. The court points out that "the content expressly permitted by the Disciplinary
Rules is factual, and most of the specific prohibitions of the Disciplinary Rules relate to promotional
content." Id. at 1224-25.
231. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Proposal "A" 1977).
232. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Proposal "B" 1977).
233. See, e.g., FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-l01(C)(5) (1983); see generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(C)(5) (Proposal "B" 1977) (prohibiting ads that appeal primarily to lay person's fear, greed, desire for revenge, or similar emotion).
234.

See, e.g., FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(C)(6) (1983).

235. See Bishop v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1228-29 (S.D. Iowa 1981)
(dramatic voice, background sounds such as sirens), vacated, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982); Committee on Prof. Ethics v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa 1984) (visual displays, multiple
dramatic voices, self-laudatory statements), vacated, 105 S.Ct. 2693 (1985), aff'd on rehearing, 377
N.W.2d 643 (1985), petition for cert. filed., 54 U.S.L.W. 3585 (1986).
236. See generally MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (Proposal "A"
1977) (information must be presented in a dignified manner); see also Spencer v. Supreme Court,
579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984). An attorney argued that the term "dignified" was unconstitutionally vague. Id. In response the court wrote "I have no doubt that lawyers are capable of
distinguishing between a dignified and undignified advertisement.... The state has a substantial
interest in maintaining the image and stature of the legal profession. This interest is advanced by
requiring lawyer advertisements to be 'dignified'." Id. at 892; cf In re Utah Bar, 647 P.2d 991
(Utah 1984) (stating rules for attorney advertising should include provisions to guard against the
making of common, cheap, or undignified claims). "This 'I know it when I see it' approach [in
Bishop] has as many pitfalls in the area of regulation of attorney advertising as have been exposed
in connection with other kinds of regulation." Id. at 998 n.1 (Durham, J., dissenting and concurring). Furthermore,
[a]lthough attorneys are officers of the court, and may be held by the courts themselves
to certain standards in all of their relations with the courts, it is difficult to perceive how
any interest of the public may be served by restrictions designed to enforce "dignity",
even assuming such restrictions could be properly drawn.
Id. at 997 (Durham, J., dissenting and concurring).
237. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 11-25.
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ads from a highly critical and legalistic viewpoint. Consequently, ads written
in simple and direct layman's language are often prohibited as misleading or
deceptive. 23 81 Such an approach is inconsistent with the Ethical Canons of most
23 9
state bars urging the use of plain, intelligible language.
B.

Constitutional Limitations

The classification of quality and self-laudation claims is important. Content
limitations are permissible only to the extent a substantial state interest is directly furthered in the least restrictive manner available. 24" Presentation of the
advertisement's content may be regulated only if reasonably and rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 2 4 Some states restrict content relating to
quality or self-laudation 242 while other states restrict claims presented in a selflaudatory manner.2 4" The former states must satisfy the Central Hudson test while
the latter need only satisfy the rational basis test. Some courts perform the
proper analysis by classifying or characterizing the type of ad or manner in
which the ad is presented and then applying the appropriate test.2 44 Other courts
presume quality or self-laudatory claims are inherently misleading and may be
totally prohibited.2 4 Therefore, discretionary interpretations and a muddling of
the proper methodology exist among the jurisdictions.
The regulatory type of bar codes clearly restrict the allowable content of
attorney advertisements. Following R.M.J., these types of codes are highly suspect because they prohibit certain types of information that can be presented nondeceptively. 246 The regulatory codes prohibiting self-laudation and quality claims
may also preclude the presentation of truthful claims relating to an attorney's

238. Cf. In re Hodges, 279 S.C. 128, 130, 303 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1983) (Harwell, J., dissenting)
("Of necessity, [the ad] had to be written in simple, direct layman's language if it was to be of
any value to the consuming public."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 393 (1984).
239. See FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-10 (1983). The Florida Code,
in EC 2-10, urges that "[a]ll publicity should be directed with concern for its effect on the layman"
and "[tlhe non-lawyer is best served if advertisements are written in plain, accurate, and concise
language which will not confuse or mislead the uninformed layman." See generally CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-9, 2-10 (1983) (benefits of lawyer advertising are generated by reliable,
accurate, objective and understandable information).
240. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
241.
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 503-12 (1980).
242. See L. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 135-46. Both Proposal "A" and "B" contain prohibitions on self-laudatory statements. Consequently, since most state codes are versions of either
"A" or "B" they also contain such prohibitions. Proposal "B" prohibits explicit or implicit statements of opinion regarding the quality of an advertiser's services. Id. at 125.
243. In 1980, 24 states had requirements that ads be presented in a dignified manner. Id. at
135-146.
244. In re Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 41 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985).
245. Bishop, v. Committee on Prof. Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981), vacated, 686
F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982). "A total prohibition on any claims of quality directly advances the
governmental interest [in precluding potentially misleading content], and is not more extensive than
is necessary to serve that interest." Id. at 1225.
246. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
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qualifications or performance. As a result, consumers are denied the most inexpensive and effective manner of acquiring this type of information. The directive type bar codes also extend too broadly. By prohibiting any form of
communication containing elements of quality or self-laudatory claims, directive
codes also restrict truthful claims. Applying the R.M.J. rationale to quality and
self-laudation prohibitions indicates the existing prohibitions are constitutionally
impermissible. Total prohibitions are unjustified absent a narrowly tailored substantial state interest. 24 7 Even if a substantial interest justified regulation, a total
prohibition would be unnecessarily extensive. Since quality and self-laudatory
claims are presentable in non-deceptive manners, total prohibitions are inappropriate.

248

VI.

ALTERNATIVES TO ABSOLUTE PROHIBITIONS

A.

False, Misleading or Deceptive Standard

Absolute prohibitions on certain types of content in attorney advertising
generally sweep too broadly. Every state bar code includes a prohibition on
false, misleading or deceptive communications. 249 The prohibition is flexible
enough to include all problems encountered by state bars in regulating attorney
advertising. For example, under the FTC Act, providing for regulation of unfair
or deceptive advertising, the following advertisements are unlawful: (1) directly
false or misleading advertisements; (2) impliedly false or misleading advertisements; (3) advertisements that fail to disclose material information; (4) unsubstantiated advertising claims; and (5) unfair advertisements that are not
deceptive. 250 Similarly, state bars should remove all restrictions on disseminating
information while retaining the false, misleading or deceptive standard.
The FTC advocates such a position.2 5 In a recent empirical study on attorney advertising, the Commission found jurisdictions with the least restrictive
advertising standards had the lowest prices. 25 2 The prices of five standard legal
services declined as the number of restrictions declined. 2 3 Also, the number of
attorneys advertising increased as restrictions were removed. 54 The Commission
also found that attorneys advertising specific services tended to provide those
services at a lower price than non-advertisers.2 5 The Commission concluded
that removing restrictions on truthful, non-deceptive advertising practices would
25 6
provide a pro-competitive influence to the market.
247. Id.
248.

See supra notes 179-95 and accompanying text (discussing information remedies that provide

regulators with methods of controlling potentially deceptive messages).
249.
code).
250.

251.
252.
253.
and (5)
254.
255.
256.

See L. ANDREWS, supra note 12, at 97-146 (detailing the various provisions of each state
See Holmes, supra note 57, at 563-79.
FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 68, at 126.

Id.
Id. The five services are: (1) simple will; (2) will with trust; (3) bankruptcy; (4) divorce;
personal injury case.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Disclosures: Mandatory and Triggered

In Zauderer, the Court upheld a requirement that Ohio attorneys advertising
their availability to represent clients on a contingency fee basis also include
information on whether the fee is calculated before or after deducting court
costs. 2 17 This requirement is an example of the information remedy termed a
triggered disclosure. 258 The disclosure's purpose is straightforward: an advertiser
making a particular type of potentially misleading claim must also provide
additional qualifying information to prevent consumer deception. For example,
the use of the word "experienced" provides consumers with little information
regarding an attorney's qualifications.25 9 Rather than prohibiting the use of such
descriptive terms, additional qualifying information might be appropriate to
enable consumers to better judge the claim. However, whether the same potential for deception is present in this example compared to the contingency
fee advertisement in Zauderer is questionable. Consumers reading an ad stating
"If there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients" are likely to
believe litigation is a no-lose proposition.2 61) In contrast, an ad stating "experienced attorney" conveys little additional information compared to an ad simply
stating "attorney." Seemingly, the potential for deception in such a case is
minimal. Such an ad may only initiate further searches for information by some
consumers. In any case, the R.M.J. test determines whether a particular restriction is appropriate. States may impose restrictions on advertisements when
the particular content or method is inherently misleading or when experience
26 1
has proven such advertising is subject to abuse.
The Bates and R.M.J. Courts emphasized disclosure requirements, such as
warnings or disclaimers, might be appropriate to reduce the potential for consumer confusion or deception.2 11 Currently, many states require the use of
disclaimers when attorneys advertise their areas of specialization."' Some states
even require that all ads contain mandatory disclaimers regarding the quality
of service or the advertiser's expertise.2 6 However, the judicious use of disclaimers must be ultimately guided by the effect on consumers. For example,
consumers may perceive disclaimers as denials of expertise, thereby reducing

257. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2281-83.
258. See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Spencer v. Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (prohibition on
use of words which subjectively characterize attorney's credentials or quality).
260. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2283.
261. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203.
262. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 201; accord Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282-

83.
263. See supra notes 206-08. See also Spencer v. Supreme Court, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (disclaimer requirement more extensive than necessary to prevent misinterpretation).
264. See Lyon v. Alabama State Bar, 451 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1984). Alabama requires all ads
to contain the disclaimer, "No representation is made about the quality of legal services to be
performed or the expertise of the lawyer performing such services." Id. at 1372. The court upheld
the disclaimer requirement because the bar had no rating system for attorneys and readers might
believe an attorney advertising a specialty had greater expertise than a non-advertising attorney.
Id. at 1373.
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their confidence in the advertiser's abilities. 265 Disclaimer requirements may
actually adversely affect the flow of truthful information. Since all disclaimers
increase the cost of disseminating information, reducing the amount of infor266
mation in the marketplace, they must be proportionate to the interest served.
As the Zauderer Court recognized, unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure
requirements chill protected speech and violate the first amendment. 267 The
Court held that an advertiser's interests are protected if disclosure requirements
are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing consumer deception.2 68
VII.

CONCLUSION

Retaining current restrictions on attorney quality and self-commendation
claims is inappropriate for a number of reasons. First, quality and self-commendation claims that are not false or misleading are constitutionally protected
absent a substantial state interest. Even with such an interest, an absolute
prohibition on such claims would be unconstitutional under R.MJ. Therefore,
states must allow quality and self-commendation subject to reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions. False, misleading, and deceptive ads remain
subject to government regulation. Second, restraints must be consistent with
the mandate for competition in the provision of commercial information. The
first amendment commercial speech doctrine requires an unrestricted flow of
truthful information throughout all sectors of the economy. Restrictions hindering the dissemination of commercial information are inconsistent with a competitive free market economy. Finally, the existing false, misleading or deceptive
standard provides adequate protection. Past experience by the FTC and consumer protection organizations indicates this standard economically and efficiently protects the information markets. Consequently, existing restraints on
quality and self-commendation should be eliminated to preserve consumers'
rights to truthful commercial information.
Scott Makar
265. See Lovett & Linder, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903 (D.R.I. 1981). In barring a
disclaimer form, the court relied upon an informal survey of 33 people that concluded "of the ten
people who commented on the disclaimer form of ad seven disliked it stating 'the ad sounds
unprofessional and shady'; 'the lawyer seems unsure of himself.' " Id. at 911.
266. Beales, Craswell, & Salop, supra note 26, at 528-29.
267. Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2282.
268. Id. at 2283.
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